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1. INTRODUCTION 
May Congress use its appropnatlOn power to direct the 
President to step up a war?l When Congress uses its spending 
power for intensifying a war-stepping it up, pressing it more 
aggressively-against the resistance of a "less hawkish" 
Commander in Chief, who wins? 
The subject of spending provisions, also called appropriation 
riders, that limit the scope or duration of a war has certainly 
received commentary.2 By contrast, no one has discussed 
Congress's use of its spendin~ power to compel the President to 
step up action in the war zone. Yet constitutional collisions about 
stepping up wars do occur and will occur again. Moreover, this 
new subject stimulates a reconsideration of the constitutional 
Copyright 2011, by CHARLES TIEFER. 
* Commissioner, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; Professor, University of Baltimore Law School; B.A., summa cum 
laude, Columbia College, 1974; J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law School, 
1977. This Article represents solely the view of its author alone and not those of 
the Commission or any other commissioner. Further information on this 
statutorily created Commission and its televised hearings may be found on its 
website, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov. The author appreciates the special 
assistance of Michael Glennon and Peter Raven-Hansen and the assistance of 
William C. Banks, Neal Devins, Louis Fisher, Christopher Ford, and Jules 
Lobel. The responsibility for all views and errors is the author's. 
l. For general treatments ofthe subject, see WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER 
RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 
(1994); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. 2004); THOMAS M. 
FRANCK ET AL., FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS (3d ed. 2008); MICHAEL GLENNON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996). 
2. Four years ago, the author wrote about appropriation riders to restrain or 
end a war, with citations to previous studies of the subject. Charles Tiefer, Can 
Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exitfrom Iraq?, 42 STAN. J.INT'L L. 291 (2006). 
3. That is not to say there is no literature on kindred subjects, e.g., when 
Congress may enact mandatory appropriations that a President must spend. In 
addition, there has been one recent article mentioning one particular, relatively 
obscure way that Congress might get around Presidents who do not wage a 
particular kind of war. William Young, Note, A Check on Faint-Hearted 
Presidents: Letters of Marque and Reprisal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 895, 911-
12 (2009). 
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history of appropriation riders about wars generally, which makes 
it both a relevant and an important topic.4 
As a commissioner on the federal Commission on Wartime 
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan established in 2008 by 
Congress, the author has been immersed in the practical interactions 
between congressional legislation and the conduct of the 
Afghanistan war. Such experience generates realistic hypotheticals 
demonstrating how this long, frustrating war may trigger future war-
powers clashes in which Presidents get pressed to act "more 
hawkishly." Practically speaking, such clashes may occur whenever 
the opposition to the President becomes as strong in Congress as it 
did, most recently, from 1995-2000 and 2007-2008. 
This Article posits differences of view in the 201 Os toward the 
Afghanistan war as a way to revisit, generally, the history of 
constitutional disputes over war-related appropriation riders. 
Describing the differences in very simplistic terms,5 a "hawkish" 
opposition in Congress may gain political strength at any time, 
such as in 2010 or 2014,6 not necessarily because of the war issues 
but perhaps from running on a political platform in which a 
4. This Article builds on impressive recent work that shows congressional 
war powers far stronger than argued by those supporting the positions taken by 
President George W. Bush. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and 
Original Understanding, 121 HARv. L. REv. 689, 756-57 & n.201 (2008) 
[hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem]; David J. Barron & 
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A 
Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REv. 941 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & 
Lederman, A Constitutional History]; Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the 
Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of 
War, 69 OHIO ST. LJ. 391 (2008). 
5. It is not suggested that wars in general, and the Afghanistan war in 
particular, fall simplistically into the dichotomies or hypotheticals being 
discussed. Some members of Congress who otherwise have sterling "hawkish" 
credentials-they favored maximum efforts in past wars and support full-sized 
military budgets-might think the United States would do better just to get out 
of Afghanistan. Conversely, members of Congress who otherwise have "dovish" 
credentials and usually support any President under "hawkish" criticism might 
join the "hawks" on particular issues that appeal to them, like eradication of 
opium poppies. A policy discussion about this would have to concern far more 
fleshed-out facts and would be nuanced. It is only for illuminating the general 
constitutional law of war powers that simplistic dichotomies and hypotheticals 
will serve. For these, too-fine political and policy distinctions would be 
distracting. 
6. For the author's previous discussion of this pattern in the midterm 
congressional elections of Presidents' second terms-a 2004 prediction which 
proved correct in 2006--see CHARLES TIEFER, VEERING RIGHT: How THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION SUBVERTS THE LAW FOR CONSERVATIVE CAUSES 315-16 
(2004). 
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"hawkish" view of the war is one of the platform's explicit or 
implicit planks.7 An elected "hawkish" majority in Congress may 
want to use tougher measures in the theatre of war than the 
President. It would enact measures past the bounds of policy set by 
the President as its way to step up the war. 
Meanwhile, a relatively "less hawkish" President may oppose 
the steps demanded by Congress. As Professor Gregory Sidak 
noted, "[t]oday, of course, we are so accustomed to thinking of 
Presidents as more hawkish than Congress that the hypothetical" of 
a "more hawkish" Congress "would strike many as preposterous. 
Yet history provides a number of commonly ignored examples."s 
This Article will mention those examples in their historical 
contexts. 
Consider how, in 2009, when General McChrystal proposed to 
commit more troops to Afghanistan, Republican congressional 
leaders called for General McChrystal to come to Congress and to 
testify prior to the President's decision.9 Those leaders also called 
for "full" approval of the general's proposal. 10 The dispute 
7. The Republican majority of the House starting with the 1994 election 
did not become strong primarily, or even significantly, because of its position, 
discussed below, that American troops should not serve under a U.N. flag. Yet, 
once that Republican majority became strong from the rest of its platform 
(primarily domestic issues), that meant it had strength for its position on 
controversies over the military serving under a U.N. flag. 
8. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 85-86 (1991). 
Professor Sidak more particularly noted: 
Today, of course, we are so accustomed to thinking of Presidents as 
more hawkish than Congress that the hypothetical of a dovish President 
would strike many as preposterous. Yet, history provides a number of 
commonly ignored examples: John Adams resisted calls for a 
declaration of war against France in 1798 and instead sought authority 
for the limited and undeclared Quasi-War; James Madison was 
ambivalent about declaring war on Britain in 1812; Grover Cleveland 
in 1896 rebuffed the proposal by various members of Congress to 
declare war on Spain; William McKinley in 1898 reluctantly conceded 
to the same war fervor; and Woodrow Wilson successfully campaigned 
for reelection in 1916 on the slogan, "He kept us out of war." 
Id. (footnotes omitted). The 1990s include the example, discussed below, of a 
Congress that opposed overseas interventions during which troops served under 
a U.N. flag. In the general environment of seeing the U.N. as committed to 
"softer" approaches like nation-building and similar action in concert with 
developing countries, and the U.S.'s commitment to "harder" approaches such 
as the 1991 Gulf War campaign crushing Saddam Hussein's armed forces, the 
U.N. flag issue was, loosely speaking, about how "hawkish" to be. 
9. Ann Scott Tyson, Gates to Boost "Enablers" in Afghanistan Mission, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 18,2009, at A18. 
10. Karen DeYoung, Afghan Policy Battle on Horizon: General's Call for 
More Troops Divides Military and Policymakers, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 22, 
2009, at AI. 
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adumbrated situations in which a working majority in Congress 
may take a more "hawkish" view than the Commander in Chief, 
who does not want such anticipatory testimony and who wants a 
different approach than merely giving such "full" approval. Such 
disputes are the stuff that constitutional clashes are made of. 
Looking at the kinds of examples considered in this Article, 
suppose Congress passes a mandatory appropriation of several 
billion dollars for moving militarily, as America has so often 
done, II against nearby border "sanctuaries,,,12 in this instance those 
of the Taliban in Pakistan. 13 Pakistan's own increasing willingness 
in 2010 to challenge the Taliban made this less unthinkable than 
before. Suppose Congress creates a highly intrusive Select 
Committee on the War in Afghanistan that pulls generals off the 
battlefield into the hearing room to "unleash" them so that they 
will be more aggressive than their President. 14 Or, suppose 
Congress enacts a mandatory appropriationl5 for a program of 
11. Examples from the Indochina War and the Korean War are discussed 
below. Other examples include a long history of "hot pursuit" and other moves 
across the boundaries of the continental United States. "Examples extend from 
President Monroe's orders to General Jackson in 1818 to pursue Indians in the 
South into Spanish territory of Florida to President Wilson's dispatch of troops 
in 1916 to pursue the Pancho Villa bandits across the Mexican border." Note, 
Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. 
L. REv. 1771, 1789 (1968). For a more general treatment of the subject, see 
Note, International Law and Military Operations Against Insurgents in Neutral 
Territory, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1127 (1968). 
12. The example derives from the enormously controversial decision of 
President Nixon, during the Vietnam War, to send troops into Laos and 
Cambodia to clear out "border sanctuaries" and the responses from a 
Democratic Congress to enact appropriation limitations preventing further war-
expanding incursions. Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 4; 
Timothy Guiden, Defending America's Cambodian Incursion, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L 
& COMPo L. 215 (1994). 
13. The notion that Pakistan has border sanctuaries for the Taliban in 
Afghanistan is discussed in SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES: 
AMERICA'S WAR IN AFGHANISTAN (2009); AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO 
CHAOS: THE U.S. AND THE DISASTER IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND 
CENTRAL ASIA (rev. paperback ed. 2009). 
14. The example discussed below derives from the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War during the Civil War. It contrasts with highly regarded 
committees, such as Senator J.W. Fulbright'S performance of invaluable, if 
belated, oversight on the Vietnam War. See Robert 1. Reinstein & Harvey A. 
Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. 
REv. 1113,1152 & n.204 (1973). 
15. Congress words most war appropriations as lump sums as to which the 
President has limited legal discretion, in consultation with the appropriation 
committees, to redistribute sums away from certain programs. However, 
Congress may choose words of a mandatory nature that take away the 
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spraying defoliants on areas of opium poppy cultivation under 
Taliban control, a step that clashes with the executive policy (in the 
Bush and Obama administrations alike) of not wanting to force the 
local poppy farmers to join Taliban forces. 
This Article does not look at such hypotheticals, of course, to 
discuss their policy implications. 16 Rather, the discussion seeks to 
develop the analytical structure about whether a "hawkish" 
Congress may constitutionally enact various kinds of provisions. 
The provisions at issue have been chosen so as not to aim at 
restricting wa~~ rather, these make a reluctant Commander in Chief 
step up a war. 
Accordingly, Part II of this Article provides the constitutional 
history of Congress's war appropriation riders. It develops the key 
background events, shedding a special light on the Framers' intent 
in wording the potent "No Appropriation" provision in the 
negative so that Congress would have a great power to limit, not to 
force, action. IS Proper agpropriation riders derive great support 
from the plenary nature, venerable history,20 and contemporary 
significance21 of Congress's power of the purse.22 
President's legal discretion to withhold funds from a program. The question then 
becomes one of presidential impoundment. See infra Part IV.D. 
16. To repeat, the views expressed here are not those of the Commission or 
any other Commissioner. In fact, they are also not views, as to the policy issues 
regarding poppy eradication and so on, of this Commissioner. These are pure 
hypotheticals posed in order to ground the constitutional analysis. 
17. Some may ask whether Congress is ever more "hawkish"· than a 
President. The short answer is: several times Congress has declared war when 
the President would probably have preferred peace. Stand-out examples include 
the push on President Madison from the congressional "war hawks" in 1812 and 
the push on President McKinley from the empire-minded congressional 
Republicans in 1898. See supra note 8. 
18. Even the strong believers in presidential power would let Congress 
prevent or stop an intervention by denying it funding. John C. Y 00, Kosovo, 
War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1673 (2000). 
19. Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 78-
79 (1972); Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 758 (1989); Michael J. Glennon, Strengthening the War 
Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1 
(1975). 
20. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden 
War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035 (1986). 
21. FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF 
WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW (2d ed. 1989). 
22. Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988). 
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Opposed to this expansive view of Congress's power of the 
purse is the overall classic23 and contemporaryA stance of maximal 
presidential war powers.25 This pro-executive stance supports26 the 
Commander in Chief power, especially in "an active theater of 
war.'.27 This position also draws strength from past presidential 
pronouncements28 and from the more general "executive Power" 
clause.29 
Crucial developments leading up to Wodd War II show the 
range of what Congress may try to do. After 1945, America 
became a truly global power, with many more interested in raising 
the issue of Congress authorizing vel non military action.3o For 
three key decades, the "Imperial Presidency" grew. 31 This even 
included an occasional battle over impoundment of milital]' 
appropriations32 between the Presidene3 as Commander in Chief'~ 
and Congress.35 
23. Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President's Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 
WASH. U. L.Q. 693 (1990); J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the 
Purse, 1989 DUKEL.J.1l62. 
24. John C. Y 00, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The 
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167 (1996). 
25. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War 
and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 
MICH. L. REv. 1364 (1994); Sidak, supra note 8. 
26. See, e.g., Michael B. Mukasey, National Security and the Rule of Law, 
32 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 831 (2009); John C. Yoo, War and the 
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639 (2002). 
27. Boumediene v. Bush, 523 U.S. 723, 770 (2008) (noting that the 
detention facility was not "located in an active theater of war"). 
28. Executive pronouncements are collected in Robert J. Delahunty & John 
C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military 
Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or 
Support Them, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 488 (2002). Although many of those 
statements occurred in contexts where they did not justify a challenged 
executive intervention, some did. See, e.g., 112 Congo Rec. 5504 (1966) (report 
of the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State). 
29. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Robert F. Turner, War and the 
Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John 
Hart Ely's War and Responsibility, 34 VA. 1. INT'LL. 903 (1994). 
30. See, e.g., William S. Cohen, Congressional Oversight of Covert 
Actions: The Public's Stake in the Forty-Eight Hour Rule, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 285 (1989); Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic 
State: Congressional Intelligence Oversight, 81 TuL. L. REV 721 (2007). 
31. William G. Howell, Wartime Judgments of Presidential Power: Striking 
Down but Not Back, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1778 (2009). 
32. Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1505 (1973). 
33. John H. Stassen, Separation of Powers and the Uncommon Defense: 
The Case Against Impounding of Weapons System Appropriations, 57 GEO. L.1. 
1159 (1969). 
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Then came the most important ap~ropriation-limiting 
enactments: in the 19705 for the Vietnam War 6 and in the 1980s 
for the Contra conflict over the "Boland Amendments.,,37 In the 
1990s, further illumination about war-powers provisions occurred 
34. Nile Stanton, History and Practice of Executive Impoundment of 
Appropriated Funds, 53 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1974). 
35. Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL L. REv. 593 (1988); Wm. Bradford Middlekauff, 
Note, Twisting the President's Arm: The Impoundment Control Act as a Tool for 
EnforCing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure, 100 YALE L.J. 209 
(1990); Cathy S. Neuren, Note, Addressing the Resurgence of Presidential 
Budgetmaking Initiative: A Proposal to Reform the Impoundment Control Act of 
1974,63 TEX. L. REv. 693 (1984). 
36. John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Iroubled) 
Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 877 (1990) 
[hereinafter Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part 1]; John H. Ely, The 
American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They 
Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1990). 
37. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); G.H. Wolohojian, 
Note, The Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference, 88 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1534 (1988). Between Vietnam and Iran-Contra, war powers issues arose 
in 1983 as to Lebanon. See CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN 
PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING 
WITHOUT CONGRESS 123-24 (1994) [hereinafter TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN 
PRESIDENCY] (Lebanon resolution with time limitation); Martin Wald, Note, The 
Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1407 (1984). As 
Solicitor of the House of Representatives in 1984-1995, the author represented 
the House in constitutional cases on national security and was privileged enough 
to see events like the conflict over the Boland Amendments. See, e.g., Am. 
Foreign Servo Ass'n v. Garfmkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989) (vacating ruling striking 
down as unconstitutional a classified information provision in an appropriation 
bill). For a previous article discussing the role of congressional counsel, see 
Charles Tiefer, The FAS Proposal: Valid Check or Unconstitutional Veto?, in 
FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES? 
143 (Peter Raven-Hansen ed., 1987), reprinted in FRANCK ET AL., supra note 1, 
at 728-32. As Special Deputy Chief Counsel on the House Iran-Contra 
Committee, the author co-authored the chapter in the committee report on the 
Boland Amendments. H.R. REp. No. 100-433, at 489-500 (1987). For a previous 
discussion drawing on that service, see George W. Van Cleve & Charles Tiefer, 
Navigating the Shoals of "Use" Immunity and Secret International Enterprises 
in Major Congressional Investigations: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55 
Mo. L. REv. 43 (1990). The author filed the amicus brief for the House 
Leadership Group in Garfinkel. Brief of the Speaker and Leadership Group of 
the U.S. House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae, Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 
(No. 87-2127). The brief addressed the constitutionality of the appropriation 
rider in that case, while also arguing the mootness issue, which the Court 
accepted. The issues were nicely treated in Michael Glennon, Publish and 
Perish: Congress's Effort to Snip Snepp, Before and AFSA, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 
163 (1989). 
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during the course of the military interventions of the 
administrations of President George H. W. Bush38 and of President 
Bill Clinton,39 including President Clinton's intervention in the 
1999 bombing campaign against Serbia.4o 
Most recently, the Bush administration41 took extreme 
positions42 on the executive's constitutional powers that shape the 
contemporary discussion of war powers in the Obama 
administration. These positions related to a range of war 
contexts,43 such as the "global war on terror,,,44 commission 
trials,45 detention and extreme treatment of terror suspects and 
Iraqi war prisoners,46 eavesdropping,47 and interpretation of the 
38. TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY, supra note 37, at 119-36; 
Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Clinton Administration and War Powers, 63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (2000). 
39. For example, the Republican Congress of the 1990s disagreed with 
President Clinton about whether American troops should serve under a U.N. 
flag, producing a constitutional clash. Richard Hartzman, Congressional Control 
of the Military in a Multilateral Context, 162 MIL. L. REv. 50 (1999); see Tiefer, 
supra note 2, at 320--21. 
40. Charles Tiefer, Adjustable Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-
Executive Controversies About International Organizations, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 
239 (2000) (noting that the Kosovo and Serbia bombing campaign fits other 
aspects of Congressional-executive controversies); Charles Tiefer, War 
Decisions in the Late 1990s by Partial Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN 
DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Tiefer, War Decisions]; Michael Hahn, 
Note, The Conflict in Kosovo: A Constitutional War?, 89 GEO. L.J. 2351 (2001). 
For a survey of these 1990s provisions, see Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential 
Declarations of War, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 321 (2003). For a strong criticism 
of presidential claims to war powers culminating in criticisms of both the Bush 
and Clinton administration positions, see Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential 
Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1637 (2000). 
41. This Article uses "the Bush administration" to refer only to the 
administration of President George W. Bush, and not that of his father, President 
George H.W. Bush. 
42. CHARLES TIEFER, VEERING RIGHT (2004). 
43. David Gray Adler, George Bush and the Abuse of History: The 
Constitution and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 75, 120--30 (2007). 
44. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional 
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2047 (2005). But 
see David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal 
and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International 
Terrorism, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 71 (2002) (discussing how actual compromise 
on the September 14,2001 resolution moderated presidential power). 
45. Doran G. Arik, Note, The Tug of War: Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals and the Struggle to Balance National Security and Constitutional 
Values During the War on Terror, 16 J.L. & POL'y 657 (2008). 
46. See generally Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 
2085 (2005). 
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authorization of force after 9/11 in Afghanistan and beyond.48 The 
Bush administration also claimed enhanced power over asserted 
congressional micromanaging and about the role of presidential 
signing statements.49 
The Bush administration's expansive interpretations drew 
many reactions. The Supreme Court delivered rebukes of the Bush 
47. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES 
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opaiwhitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf; 
Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State: Congressional 
Intelligence Oversight, Sl TuL. L. REv. 721 (2007); Heidi Kitrosser, 
Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information 
Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 1049 (200S). 
48. Professor Michael Van Alstine has noted: "The Bush Administration 
has relied on claims of implied and inherent Article II authority for an assertion 
of a broad array of powers, including those regarding the war in Iraq and the 
detainment of alleged supporters of international terrorism." Michael P. Van 
Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. 
REv. 309, 312 n.S (2006). See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 1, 
which Professor Van Alstine notes as "asserting that the [P]resident has 
'inherent constitutional authority ... to conduct warrantless surveillance for 
intelligence purposes. '" Van Alstine, supra, at 312 n.S. Also see Memorandum 
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to 
the President, & William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def. 11-15, 
32-34 (Jan. 22, 2002), which Professor Van Alstine notes as "supporting the 
presidential detention of alleged foreign terrorists on the basis that '[f]rom the 
very beginnings of the Republic' the Vesting Clause of Article II 'has been 
understood to grant the President plenary control over the conduct of foreign 
relations.''' Van Alstine, supra, at 312 n.S. Similarly, Professor Van Alstine 
cites Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., & Robert 
J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the 
Dep't of Def. 14-16 (Jan. 9, 2002), as "supporting detention and use of force 
against alleged terrorists in the United States on the same grounds." Van Alstine, 
supra, at 312 n.S. Additionally, see Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, 
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REv. 545, 54S 
(2004), which notes that "[i]n recent years" the implied executive powers 
argument "has gained newfound popularity" among the Bush Administration 
and its supporters. 
49. See, e.g., Sofia E. Biller, Note, Flooded by the Lowest Ebb: 
Congressional Responses to Presidential Signing Statements and Executive 
Hostility to the Operation of Checks and Balances, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1067 
(200S); Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 
120 HARV. L. REv. 597 (2006); Malinda Lee, Comment, Reorienting the Debate 
on Presidential Signing Statements: The Need for Transparency in the 
President's Constitutional Objections, Reservations, and Assertions of Power, 
55 UCLA L. REv. 705 (200S). 
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administration in the major cases of Hamdan v. Rumsjeld,50 Rasul 
v. Bush,51 and Boumediene v. Bush.52 Congress passed provisions 
like the McCain Amendment (the "Detainee Treatment Act"), 
which prohibited extreme treatment of detainees. 53 President 
Obama reacted against his predecessor's assertions of power, to a 
measured extent, by a promise to rein in signing statements.54 
Part III of this Article uses the just-summarized constitutional 
history to set up and to apply a basic structure to categorize 
congressional appropriation riders. Although the main focus is to 
contextualize provisions for stepping up a war, the approach also 
yields insight regarding all war-related appropriation riders. In 
light of history, whether provisions are presumptively 
unconstitutional depends on whether the provision goes to the very 
core of the Commander in Chiefs more "central" concerns in the 
war zone:55 command,56 disposition of forces, and military 
campaigns. 57 
50. 548 U.S. 577 (2006); see Gordon G. Young, Youngstown, Hamdan, and 
"Inherent" Emergency Presidential Policymaking Powers, 66 Mo. L. REv. 787 
(2007). 
51. 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see Ari Aranda, The Supreme Court's Post-9/J1 
War-on-Terror Jurisprudence: Special Considerations, Threshold 
Determinations, and Anticipatory Review, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 645 (2008). 
52. 553 U.S. 723 (2008); see Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient 
Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 973 
(2009); Case Comment, Extraterritorial Reach of Writ of Habeas Corpus, 122 
HARV. L. REv. 395 (2008). 
53. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 801, 119 Stat. 
2739,2744; see Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chiep, 
81 IND. L.J. 1145 (2006). 
54. Neal Devins, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, 
12 GREEN BAG 137, 142--43 (2009). 
55. For a different way of evaluating the extent of infringement of a 
provision on the Commander in Chief concerns, see Tiefer, supra note 2, at 
320-25. 
56. Training of British Flying Students in the U.S., 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 
61-62 (1941) ("[T]he President's responsibility as Commander in Chief 
embraces the authority to command and direct the armed forces in their 
immediate movements and operations .... "). In an apt distinction: 
[Congress] also has a distinct enumerated power to provide for armies 
and navies, and to prescribe the uses to be made for them. There is 
nothing inconsistent between this proposition and another one, which 
arises from a combined reading of the declaration of war clause and the 
President's power as Commander in Chief. This is the proposition that 
under those circumstances in which Congress has affirmatively 
embraced a commitment to belligerent activities overseas on a 
sustained basis, it may not presume to dictate the minute strategy and 
tactics of the President's conduct of the authorized enterprise. 
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A different. category of provisions do collide with those 
"central" concerns, but not at the core and only to the extent of 
infringing those concerns at their periphery. 58 Finally, the last type 
involves "shared" (rather than President-"central") provisions: 
issues as to which Congress does not go squarely against those 
specifically Commander in Chief-centered issues. For these, 
Congress may have express Article I grants of powers or a full 
history of legislative action. This approach parallels the "three 
zone" classification used by the key opinion in Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Smtyer.59 
Part IV proceeds to apply the analysis to three hypothetical 
measures, one in each of these categories that Congress might 
enact years from now in the Afghan conflict. First, Congress may 
enact a provision that directs the President to make an armed 
incursion into "border sanctuaries" within Pakistan.60 Such 
congressional action would collide with the core of the 
Commander in Chiefs central issue of Cainpaigning.61 
The next Section of Part IV studies a congressional mechanism 
for intrusively overseeing command-a special oversight 
committee. This Section delves into the under-appreciated history 
of congressional wartime inquiries. It compares the infamous joint 
committee that oversaw the conduct of the Civil War with the 
Charles Bennett et aI., The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus 
Congress' War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 17, 46-
47 (1988) (statement of Professor William Van Alstine). 
57. See 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 259, 260 (1909) (upholding as constitutional a 
Congressional provision mandating that 8% of detachments aboard naval vessels 
consist of marines). 
58. Lobel, supra note 4. 
59. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952). For recent treatments of the Bush 
administration's initiatives in light of Youngstown, see, for example, Joseph C. 
Hansen, Murder and the Military Commissions: Prohibiting the Executive's 
Unauthorized Expansion of Jurisdiction, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1871 (2009); Mark 
D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View That Jackson's 
Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and the Commander-in-
Chief, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1703 (2007); Kathryn L. Einspanier, Note, 
Burlamaqui, the Constitution, and the Imperfect War on Terror, 96 GEO. L.J. 
985 (2008). 
60. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional 
Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. 
REv. 61 (2007). 
61. This is one of those issues of the Commander in Chief power in which 
intemationallaw overlaps with constitutional interpretation. See id. 
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praiseworthy major oversight inquiry at the start of the Korean 
War.62 
The third Section of Part IV analyzes a hypothetical provision 
as to "shared" issues of Congress and the President,63 in contrast to 
the prior examples that affect the "central" Commander in Chief 
issues.64 Namely, this Part considers a congressional provision 
mandating a poppy eradication program. Alsos this Part reviews 
the complex history of military impoundments.6 
Part V, this Article's conclusion, discusses how consideration 
of the issues surrounding "more hawkish" congressional action 
shakes up habitual ways of thinking. This approach invites 
observers to rethink their settled presumptions. The unspoken 
assumption has been that a strong Commander in Chief power 
invariably drives an unwelcome expansion of war. To think 
otherwise opens new frontiers for study of the war power. 
A republic decays into an empire when its people no longer 
rule in wartime. Yet, the conduct of national combat requires unity 
of command. Will the constitutional law of war powers harmonize 
these seemingly irreconcilable principles, not only when the 
legislature wishes to restrain the executive, but when it seeks to 
step up the war? 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
To treat the relevant constitutional history about Congress, 
appropriations, and war powers, this Part divides it into three 
sections: original intent (going back to English and colonial 
precedents); the period up to 1945; and since 1945. Most of the 
instances concern interactions in which Congress limited or 
restricted war, with few having to do with Congress stepping up a 
war. From the limitation provision examples, the author derives a 
sense of what Congress does that collides with Commander in 
Chief central issues at their core, Commander in Chief central 
62. BRUCE TAP, OVER LINCOLN'S SHOULDER: THE COMMlITEE ON THE 
CONDUCT OF THE WAR (1998). 
63. See, e.g., J. Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power to 
Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEx. L. REv. 843 
(2007). 
64. For example, in the mid-1990s, the Republican Congress did move a 
number of measures that raised such issues. James P. Terry, The President as 
Commander in Chief, 7 AVE MARIA L. REv. 391,417 (2009) (not enforcing an 
arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims). 
65. Roy E. Brownell, II, The Constitutional Status of the President's 
Impoundment of National Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. I (2001) 
(the leading work on military impoundment). 
2011] CAN CONGRESS STEP UP A WAR? 403 
issues at their periphery, or shared issues between Congress and 
the President. 
A. Original Intent 
Of all the Constitution's clauses, the one with the greatest 
importance for appropriation provisions, from its text and history, 
is the ''No Appropriations" clause: Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 
provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.,,66 The Framers 
placed this clause with, and worded it sternly like, the other 
emphatic interdicts in Article I, Section 9, rather than with the 
general affirmative powers in Article I, Section 10. From the "No 
Appropriations" clause, Congress derives the great power to attach 
conditions to funding, such as attaching to military appropriations 
during the Indochina War in the 1970s that "none of the funds shall 
be used" for ground operations across the borders in Laos and 
Cambodia.67 
1. British Antecedents 
In terms of original intent, the wording of the constitutional 
text for Congress's spending power provisions, against the 
background of English and colonial traditions, vests the power of 
the purse in the legislature for specific reasons. Spending control 
aimed to keep power over the initiation of war in the people's 
representative bodies. Parliament moved in that direction in the 
Tudor and early Stuart years68 and in steps leading up to the 
English Civil War.69 Parliament established that the Crown must 
accept the conditions accompanying the revenues to initiate wars.70 
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 
496 U.S. 414 (1990). 
67. FISHER, supra note 1, at 142-43. 
68. The historic conflict in England between the Stuart monarchs and the 
House of Commons led to these clauses, which specifically established the 
legislative power to dictate the terms and conditions for spending revenue upon 
shaping the initiation of war. Gerhard Casper, Appropriations of Power, 13 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1990). 
69. Meanwhile, the same era laid the foundation for the modest original 
intent of the Commander in Chief clause. In 1641, Parliament had brought on 
the English Civil War by conferring control of the standing army on the Earl of 
Essex, who was under Parliament's authority, rather than leaving it with Charles 
I. Francis L. Coolidge, Jr. & Joel David Sharrow, Note, The War-Making 
Powers: The Intentions of the Framers in the Light of Parliamentary History, 50 
B.U. L. REv. (SPECIAL IsSUE) 5, 9 (1970). 
70. Casper, supra note 68, at 3-5. 
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After the Restoration, Parliament did let the King gain back the 
right of command71-prefiguring the Commander in Chief clause. 
However, the King did so within the constraints of conditions on 
funding war.72 Soon thereafter,73 the English Bill of Rights of 1689 
memorialized the Commons' victory and anticipated the United 
States Constitution.74 The 1689 measure provided, "[T]he raising 
or keeping a standing army within the kingdome in time of peace 
unlesse it be with consent ofparlyament, is against law.,,75 
More significantly for this Article, the English Bill of Rights of 
1689 worded its power of the military purse in a way that 
prefigured the "No Appropriations" clause. The English charter 
said that "levying money for or to the use of the Crowne by 
pretence of prerogative without grant of Parlyament for longer 
time or in other manner then the same is or shall be granted is 
illegal.,,76 This language speaks potently about the origins of the 
Constitution's "No Appropriations" clause. The language realized 
a strong desire for means, through temporal limitation, to restrain 
the executive. First, of course, it speaks in the negative-taking 
unauthorized funding is illegal-but not spending authorized 
funding falls under other provisions, which may not pack the same 
wallop. 
Second, though, the 1689 language carries a special message 
besides its operation in the negative. Strikingly, the clause's 
asymmetric drafting obliges the Crown to submit to Parliament as 
to funding wars ''for longr time," although that drafting expressly 
chooses not to make the Crown submit to Parliament as to warring 
"for shorter time.,,77 The House of Commons made express its fear 
of the Crown warring after the waning of the Commons' support-
71. /d. 
72. Parliament maintained its purse control over troop deployments, for 
example, requiring by a 1678 act that the funds granted be used to disband the 
forces stationed in Flanders. GLENNON, supra note 1, at 287. 
73. The expulsion of James II in favor of William III in the Glorious 
Revolution established that Parliament, not the King, would decide where, and 
on what terms, to unleash military force. Casper, supra note 68. 
74. The United States Constitution has parallel provisions on raising armies 
derived from the English Bill of Rights of 1689, factoring in colonial experience 
that revived and newly intensified the issues of Tudor and Stuart times in 
England. Bernard Donohue & Marshall Smelser, The Congressional Power to 
Raise Armies: The Constitutional and Ratifying Conventions, 1787-1788, 33 
REv. POL. 202 (1971). 
75. Coolidge & Sharrow, supra note 69, at 9 (quoting Bill of Rights, 1 W. 
& M., sess. 2, c. 2 (1689) (U.K.)). 
76. Id at 8 (emphasis added) (quoting Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2). 
77. Id 
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"for longr time.,,78 The Commons had no corresponding concern 
about the Crown warring too briefly or too frugally for the 
Commons' taste. 
That wording implements a great historic lesson in the rise of 
Anglo-American democracy. It did not arise from any desire for 
Parliament itself to produce temporal expansion of the war toward 
a "longr time." That is, it did not arise for Parliament to prevent the 
executive from a moderate, "non-hawkish" conduct of war. It 
might be called the "ceiling" or "downward ratchet" message of 
the "No Appropriations" clause: the Commons may command that 
the King not take wars up above a ceiling, but he can conduct wars 
of shorter duration or less intensely, and they cannot prevent him 
from going in that direction. 
2. Constitutional Text 
An influential study of the Constitution's war proVIsIOns 
identifies the universal fear of executive excess warring to gain 
glory. With that suspicion went a corresponding trust of the 
popularly based legislature to restrain the executive's trip down 
glory road-without any such concern for some need to goad the 
. . . 79 
executive mto more warrmg. 
One could describe Parliament, and the popUlation it 
represented, as having a case of what has been termed for 40 years 
now as the "Vietnam War syndrome." That is, an unhappy and 
oppressive experience with a King's or President's taste for 
making, continuing, and escalating war motivated each generation 
of legislators. The British Parliament of the 1600s and the 
Constitutional Convention of 1789 corresponded to what occurred 
after Vietnam in the United States Congress in the 1970s, namely, 
each time the legislators spoke for a population mortally skeptical 
and critical about the executive's taste for more war. 80 
The asymmetrically drafted English Bill of Rights had similar 
roots with the purely negative "No Appropriations" clause and the 
reform war-restraining legislation of the 1970s-both of which had 
the English Bill of Rights as their antecedent. Each of these 
strengthened the power of the legislature, by appropriation limits, 
to restrain the executive's war making. Yet none of them gave any 
78. Id. 
79. William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to 
Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 695 (1997). 
80. The legislatures and charter writers of the 1600s, 1789, and the 1970s, 
and the populations they spoke for, in no way coupled their extreme skepticism 
of war stepped up by executives with any intense desire that their legislatures 
ratchet up wars over the reluctance of executives. 
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precedent for a legislature stepping up a war. Colonial 
governments similarly used riders on war-funding legislation to 
control their governors81-not to step up wars. 
Textually, and as a matter of original intent, Article I spells out 
Congress's appropriations power far more powerfully than most of 
Congress's other powers. The "Raise and Support Clause" 
provides "That the Congress shall have Power ... To raise and 
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall 
be for a longer Term than two Years. ,,82 Article I confers upon the 
Congress the power to "declare War.,,83 Article I provides a 
number of other specific grants of authority regarding war and the 
military. These range from the clause empowering Congress to 
make "Rules" and "Regulation[ s ],,84 for the milita~ to Congress 
"organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,,,8 today's state 
national guards. 
On the other hand, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, provides that 
"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States.,,86 And, Article II, Section 1, Clause 1, 
begins, "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.,,87 
Because in England the monarchy at least had the power to 
declare war (albeit potentially subject to purse-string control), and 
under the Constitution only the Congress would have that power, 
Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist, gave a famous explanation 
of the limited authority of the Commander in Chief.88 The Framers 
had a modest view of the Commander in Chief clause.89 Even the 
81. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note I, at 18-26. 
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 12. 
83. Id. cl. Ii. 
84. Id. cl. 14. 
85. !d. cl. 16. 
86. Id. art. II, § 2, c1. I. 
87. Id. § I, cl. 1. 
88. Hamilton remarked: 
The president is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the 
United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same 
with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to 
it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and 
direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of 
the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the dec/aring 
of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies, all which; 
by the constitution under consideration, would appertain to the 
legislature. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 357 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & 
James McClellan eds., 2001). 
89. At most, the Framers may have intended the Commander in Chief 
clause merely to avoid a repetition of the Continental Congress's excesses in 
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executive-minded Hamilton stressed Congress's powers would 
include "the raising and regulating of fleets and armies,,,9o which 
bespeaks how much the Framers meant for these provisions to 
have real significance for imposing controls on war. Nothing could 
have been further from the Framers' minds than for the powers 
created under these provisions to expand or to extend making war. 
Moreover, Congressional purse-string power over the scope of 
military action91 became a crucial justification of the Constitution 
during the ratification debates.92 The anti-federalists complained 
bitterly that the national government could raise a standing army 
(especially with no limit on its size set in the Constitution) and also 
going beyond mere close oversight of military efforts during the Revolutionary 
War and certain intrigues against George Washington's role as supreme 
commanding general. These intrigues ranged from establishing a Board of 
Review for the military and murmurings against Washington when the war was 
not going well, to rather extreme attempts by intriguers like General Horatio 
Gates to divide up command. JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL 
POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 121 
(1979) (murmurings, Gates); id. at 196, 201, 203 (Board of War). Presidential 
proponents sometimes suggest that the Constitution intended to expand the 
President's power because of discontent with over-interference by the 
Continental Congress. Historians do not support this view. Moreover, there is 
virtually nothing in either the Federalist Papers or the ratification debates to 
support any notion of a desire for a powerful Commander in Chief freed of 
purse-string control by Congress. In the eyes of the Constitutional Convention, 
the problem was that the national government needed more power to raise funds 
and have a national military. For this, it was essential that the public be 
reassured that control of the purse strings would vest in the accountable 
Congress. Had the draft Constitution exalted the much less accountable 
President, who might tum out to have too much taste for war, it would have 
turned off public support on this issue. 
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 357. 
91. In other contexts, executive supporters have argued that the 
Constitutional Convention reacted against the unrestrained state legislatures of 
the 1780s and took steps intended to curb Congress's powers. However, in this 
context, there seems no sign that the Convention had a mind to vest power in the 
President to supersede provisions limiting war spending. On the contrary, the 
specific language about spending no money from the treasury, except in 
consequence of appropriations made by law, came as a series of states put 
similar clauses in their own constitutions. And, the states did so because "at the 
same time states enhanced executive authority, they reinforced their legislatures' 
hold on the state fisc, principally by proscribing the expenditure of funds except 
as directed by legislative enactment." Richard D. Rosen, Funding "Non-
Traditional" Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of 
the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REv. 1,63 (1998). For a discussion of the period from the 
American Revolution to the Constitution, see Casper, supra note 68, at 6-8. 
92. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996). 
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that the national government held too much power over the state 
militias.93 In an answer that won ratification for the Constitution, 
its defenders stressed heavily the division of national authority. 
This gave effective control to the Congress, not to the President, so 
standing armies and control of the militia could not produce 
excesses of monarchical or dictatorial power.94 
As Thomas Jefferson memorably wrote in commenting on the 
Constitutional Convention's work, "we have already given ... one 
effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of 
letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from 
those who are to spend to those who are to pay.,,9S Using the 
prevalent idiom, Jefferson spoke of the President submitting to the 
Congress about letting loose "the Dog of War," not of Congress 
goading some cautious or prudent President to step up his wars. 
Accordingly, the relatively limited central issues of the 
Commander in Chief clause came to three.96 Two were command 
and campaigns. Hamilton said in The Federalist that the 
President's authority as Commander in Chief "would amount to 
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the 
military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the 
confederacy.,,97 Then, in 1895 the Supreme Court said that the 
clause "vest[ s] in the President the supreme command over all the 
military forces-such supreme and undivided command as would 
be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war.,,98 Both these 
statements concerned the President's power to command. 
The Supreme Court stated as to command and campaigning: 
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and 
govern armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the 
power to provide by law for carrying on war. This power 
necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the 
93. MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS 
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 89-100 
(2003). 
94. Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of 
the Commander-in-Chief, 80 VA. L. REv. 833, 895-96 (1994). 
95. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392,397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
96. The tension occurs between, on the one hand, "forces placed by law at 
his command," and, then, Congressional acts limiting war. Plainly, the Framers 
put their trust in Congress's using the power of the purse to limit the scope of 
war, without considering this an intrusion into actual command. Rosen, supra 
note 91, at 72-74. 
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 357 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. 
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001). 
98. United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281,284 (1895). 
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prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as 
interferes with the command of the forces and the conduct 
of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President 
-1 • h· if.99 as commanuer-ln-C Ie. 
Also, the Supreme Court said in 1850: "As commander-in-
chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the movements of the 
naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to 
employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass 
and conquer and subdue the enemy."IOO To "employ them" in order 
"to harass and conquer and subdue" amounts to the President's 
direction of campaigning. 101 
The third Commander in Chief power is disposition of forces. 
The Court commented: "As commander-in-chief, he is authorized 
to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by 
law athis command, and to employ them in the manner he may 
deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the 
enemy.,,102 The President's power to direct the movement of 
military force encompasses controlling their location in wartime 
and, to some extent, in peacetime. This presidential capability to 
base an air force in Uzbekistan across the border from the 
Afghanistan War, or, to some extent, to create new major national 
commitments by basing forces in the expanded NATO, shows the 
potency of the power of disposition of forces. 
In these and other terse yet informative descriptions, the 
Supreme Court sets forth the central components of the 
Commander in Chief power in a war zone: command, disposition 
of forces, and campaigning. 
B. To the Present 
1. Up to 1945 
The first century after the Constitution's ratification furnishes 
some examples of Congress using, or threatening to use, its power 
to put terms on military wartime appropriations,103 usually to 
99. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (emphasis added). 
100. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850). 
101. /d. 
102. Id. 
103. Colonel Rosen makes a useful comparison, as he researched the history, 
between the congressional power in the 1790s and the congressional power two 
centuries later: "The position taken by the House of Representatives in April 
1796 [about not being obliged to fund the Jay Treaty] has prevailed. This is 
exemplified today by Congress' continuing refusal to appropriate the money 
needed to satisfy dues assessed against the United States under the United 
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restrain the more forceful Presidents. 104 It is worth remembering 
how often during the 1800s a "hawkish" Congress pushed the 
President into war. Congress pushed President Madison into the 
War of 1812, and a similar Congress pushed President McKinley 
into the Spanish-American War. Although Congress had not 
convened when President Lincoln dealt with the onset of the Civil 
War, once it did convene, it showed great vigor in wanting to fight 
the war, including, sometimes, more of a taste for "hawkish" 
measures than Lincoln. 
Various nuances of Congress's power to push in "hawkish" 
directions come out in the undeclared limited naval war with 
France (sometimes called the "Quasi-War") starting in 1798.105 
Commentators have traced how ways to step up that very limited 
naval war-for example, commencing to arm merchant ships or to 
make offensive reprisals-required action by Congress, not the 
President. 1 06 But, Congress was not using appropriation riders to 
push President Adams to rev up the war. Congress simply 
increased the authorized activity beyond what it had enacted 
earlier. President Adams and President Madison, as to the War of 
1812, are both considered as less "hawkish" than their 
Congresses.107 In later wars, such as the Mexican War,108 Congress 
Nations Charter, although the United States is bound by treaty to pay the dues." 
Rosen, supra note 91, at 128 (footnote omitted). 
104. For some miscellaneous examples, see HENKIN, supra note 1, at 389-90 
n.61. 
105. A complex pattern emerges from that "Quasi-War" with France in the 
1790s. This produced several key Supreme Court opinions about Congress 
limiting the President's power to conduct hostilities. Lobel, supra note 4, at 
423-30. Congress decided on limited war, and determined what those limits 
would be, and the Supreme Court confirmed Congress's action. 
106. Lobel, supra note 20, at 1065-69. For more about the Quasi-War, see 
Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the War Powers, 141 MIL. L. REv. 83, 138-39 (1993). 
107. Sidak, supra note 8. 
108. The House twice passed a condition on an appropriation, well known as 
the "Wilmot Proviso," to bar slavery in territory to be acquired from Mexico. 
Kristian D. Whitten, The Fourteenth Amendment: Justice Bradley's Twentieth 
Century Legacy, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 143, 148 (1999). Although the final 
appropriation law omitted the proviso, the House passage of that proviso 
signaled that the free states would block slavery in the territories, while slave 
states were losing control of Congress. The proviso, and other House 
pronouncements about the Mexican War, are seen as starting the slave states 
toward doubting their future in Congress. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 381 n.33. 
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laid down markers about its setting policy for war zones that 
endure today as legislative high-water marks. 109 
Then, the Civil War itself greatly demonstrated Congress's 
power to set polic~ in the war zone by legislation or by 
appropriation riders. 10 Notably, Professor Lobel studied the 
enactment of the Second Confiscation Act, an enactment of high 
significance and the forerunner of the Emancipation 
Proclamation. III Congress legislated that the military would 
confiscate the property and free the slaves of rebels. I 12 The statute 
expressed Congress's desire without delay to push further in 
freeing slaves. It thereby embittered the South and even potentially 
alienated the border states. President Lincoln opposed what he 
considered the ill timing of the measure. 113 
One of the most important debates on Congress stepping up 
war zone action against presidential opposition occurred on this 
bill. 114 The debate distinguished between, on the one hand, 
Congress's ample power to make highly important policy in the 
war zone and, on the other hand, Congress's hesitancy to interfere 
with the President's command of battlefield campaigning. 
President Lincoln signed the final bill. 
After the Civil War, by the use of riders on military 
appropriations, congressional influence predominated in 
Reconstruction through the directions given by such riders to the 
occupation armies that controlled the southern states. I IS Even after 
109. The provisions ultimately, just over a dozen years later, led the southern 
states to their choice of secession. G. Randal Hornaday, Note, The Forgotten 
Empire: Pre-Civil War Southern Imperialism, 36 CONN. L. REv. 225 (2003). 
110. "The great volume of legislation required by the rebellion made this 
period prolific in riders." Alexander Johnston, Riders, in 3 CYCLOPAEDIA OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES (John Joseph Lalor ed., 1899), available at http://oll. 
libertyfund.orgltitle/971/63566. 
Ill. Lobel, supra note 4, at 431. 
112. !d. 
113. Id. at 437. 
114. [d. at 433-36. 
115. Johnston, supra note 110, goes through the whole period, rider by rider. 
The tone was set during the military occupation of the South immediately after 
the Civil War. It took the form of a full-scale clash between Congress and the 
President, with the Republican Congress setting policy through riders. The 
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson occurred for breaching the Tenure 
of Office Act, which limited the President's power to remove those under him in 
the chain of command. When President Johnson challenged this, Congress 
impeached him, and he barely escaped conviction by one vote. Although long 
afterward the Supreme Court made clear that the Tenure of Office Act had been 
unconstitutional, Johnson's impeachment sealed Congress's supremacy for years 
thereafter. Johnston recites a fascinating account of how, from 1876 on, the 
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the end of Reconstruction, Congress still had the upper hand 
effectively at least until the early twentieth century. 11 President 
McKinley, as to the Spanish-American War, was another President 
considered less "hawkish" than his Congress. 117 In that era, 
Congress, not the President, decided on war issues. 
During President Theodore Roosevelt's administration, 
Congress and the President wrestled for control of the expanded 
navy required by the country's larger global role after the Spanish-
American War. In one notable instance, Roosevelt's attorney 
general conceded the constitutionality of one controversial 
appropriation condition. 118 He opined sweepingly that "Congress is 
the sole judge of how the Army or Navy shall be raised and of 
what it shall be composed" and that Congress could condition 
validly "that such appropriation [for the marines] shall not be 
available unless the marine corps be employed in some designated 
[by Congress] way.,,1l9 Still, this was not wartime. 
Congress enacted one of the key war-related conditions of the 
twentieth century in 1940.120 President Franklin Roosevelt had 
staked his ability to act, at a time when public opinion largely 
wished to avoid involvement in the European war, on a distinction 
between steps he would take for preparedness and on military 
intervention overseas he pledged to avoid. Roosevelt succeeded in 
getting the nation's first peacetime draft through Congress by the 
bare margin of a single vote in the House. 121 However, Roosevelt 
did so only by accepting a famous condition that no draftees be 
stationed outside of the Western Hemisphere or the territories and 
fierce struggle over various riders for the army appropriation bills marked the 
end of Reconstruction. Briefer allusions to this occur in HENKIN, supra note 1, at 
380 n.29, and Michael 1. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest/or a Common Law 
o/Higher Lawmaking, 40 WM. &MARvL. REv. 1731,1763 (1999). 
116. Until President Theodore Roosevelt, Congress, also using the Senate's 
so-called treaty veto as well as congressional control of appropriations, set the 
bounds in military and overseas affairs. See generally Eli M. Nobleman, 
Financial Aspects 0/ Congressional Participation in Foreign Relations, 289 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 145 (1951). 
117. Sidak, supra note 8, at 86. 
118. Congress conditioned appropriations on including marines in 
detachments aboard naval vessels. 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 259 (1909). 
119. Id at 260. 
120. This particular condition was not an appropriation rider, but, rather, was 
upon the authorizing legislation for the draft. Technically, it could be dismissed 
for that reason as irrelevant to analysis of appropriation riders. History, however, 
singled out this momentous legislation to serve as the vehicle for a condition 
restraining the President from making a controversial use of his draftees. It is an 
illuminating precedent regardless of its not being an appropriation bill. 
121. Tiefer, supra note 2, at 303 & n.98. 
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possessions of the United States. I22 Roosevelt's acceptance of the 
condition deferred to Congress in its setting the limits on the use of 
the military.123 Although Congress left disposition of forces in 
wartime to the Commander in Chief, disposition of forces in 
peacetime belonged to Congress. 124 
2. Cold War and After 
During the Cold War that followed World War II, Presidents 
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 10hnson demonstrated to a 
greater or lesser extent that they would take the military machine 
raised and funded by Congress and make their own unilateral 
decisions on commitments abroad and on use of force. 125 Although 
Congressional influence diminished vis-a-vis the President, 
Congress still had a substantial role in military affairs-over 
military spending in general, and spending on overseas forces and 
foreign military aid in particular. 12 Congressional provisions as to 
foreign military aid had great significance. 127 By a system of 
122. Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 3(e), 54 Stat. 
885,886. 
123. Charles 1. Cooper, After the Imperial Presidency, 47 MD. L. REv. 84,97 
n.44 (1987). Former Assistant Attorney General Cooper, in a historically learned 
essay, notes that President Roosevelt sent troops to Greenland and Iceland 
despite the latter being outside the Western Hemisphere. Id. This was indeed a 
violation of the letter of the condition, but was not seen at the time as a serious 
violation of its spirit, as the Iceland occupation kept near the balance of 
defensive preparations rather than interventionist action. See generally Tiefer, 
supra note 2, at 303 (describing the politics surrounding the provision). 
124. That is, in peacetime the President could move his forces, such as from 
domestic to foreign bases, without an express congressional decision to do so. 
However, Congress itself might enact appropriation riders (or other legislation) 
about such movement of troops, which, despite protest from the President, had a 
fair chance of getting implemented. 
125. The Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the commitments that 
evolved into the Vietnam War were primarily presidential rather than 
congressional decisions. Congress did not effectively curb presidential war 
initiation by resort to any of its powers, including appropriations conditions, 
until the 1970s. 
126. For discussions of the significance of military aid, see, for example, 
Elizabeth Powers, Greed, Guns and Grist: u.s. Military Assistance and Arms 
Transfers to Developing Countries, 84 N.D. L. REv. 383 (2008); Stephen J. 
Wiese, Note, U.S. Foreign Aid Reform: Changing Institutional Problems in 
Order to Meet Modern Day Needs, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REv. 747 
(2009). 
127. To take one example on a prominent issue, Congress attached 
provisions against settlements in the West Bank to authorizations of military aid 
(cash or loan guarantees) to Israel, and disputes brought suspensions of 
substantial aid. Zaha Hassan, Building Walls and Burning Bridges: Legal 
Obligations of the United States with Respect to Israel's Construction of the 
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annual defense authorizations drafted by Congress's armed 
services committees, Congress arranged for an added measure of 
oversight over military affairs. 128 The extreme presidential asserted 
power to impound military spending did manifest itself 
occasionally, but so rarely as not to be convincing as to the 
existence of a continuing substantial power. During this time, 
President Truman, as to the Korean War, was yet another President 
considered less "hawkish" at times than powerful elements in his 
Congresses. 129 
After about 30 years of this system of largely executive 
control, and following on the exceptionally controversial later 
years of the Vietnam War, a congressional backlash started against 
the "Imperial Presidency. ,,130 Congress demonstrated power to 
restrain executive-initiated war in many respects, starting with cut-
offs of funding for the Indochina conflict,13 and including the War 
Powers Resolution 132 and curbing of so-called war-making 
treaties.133 In the 1980s, the Boland Amendments and the ensuing 
Iran-Contra scandal dramatically demonstrated both Congress's 
capacity to limit the President by appropriation conditions and the 
folly of the President seeking to evade those limits. 134 
Wall of Separation in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L 
L. & Drsp. REsoL. 197,235-36 (2005). 
128. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 1, at 48; BARRY M. BLECHMAN, 
THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY: CONGRESS AND U.S. DEFENSE POLICY 
30-31 (1990); Louis Fisher, Annual Authorizations: Durable Roadblocks to 
Biennial Budgeting, Pus. BUDGETING & FIN., Mar. 1983, at 23. 
129. These were the elements sympathetic to General Douglas MacArthur's 
strategy. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the congressional committee that 
reviewed the issues). 
130. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1974). 
131. The references to "Vietnam War" and "Indochina conflict" in this 
Article refer to the same war, with slight nuances as to the geography involved. 
132. GLENNON, supra note 1, at 87-122. 
133. Id. at 192-228. 
134. Sharp policy disputes often got resolved by votes on appropriation 
riders. For example, the next area for potential covert armed intervention abroad 
after the fall of Vietnam turned out to be Angola. Congress enacted the Clark 
Amendment-a condition on appropriations-to preclude such intervention in 
Angola. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 404, 90 Stat. 729, 757-58, amended by International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-533, § 
118( a}-( d), 94 Stat. 3131, 3141. For a detailed account of the provision's 
passage, particularly its roots in the Ford administration's diminished credibility 
about such interventions, see THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, 
FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 51-55 (1979). 
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At the start of the 1990s, President George H.W. Bush 
expressed impressive adherence to constitutional balance. I3S 
Namely, President Bush did not seek to start the Gulf War just by 
assertions of a Commander in Chief power, but rather sought 
straightforwardly from Congress, and Gust barel¥J obtained from 
it, Congress's own authorization for the war. 1 However, the 
senior Bush did continue and expand President Reagan's use of a 
hitherto insignificant gesture, the "signing statement.,,137 President 
Bush used this extensively for sparring with Congress. Among 
other types of provisions, he used signing statements to oppose 
defense-spending provisions that "might be construed to impinge 
on the President's authority as Commander in Chief and as the 
head of the executive branch.,,\38 
The Republican Congress in 1994-2000 took some 
illuminating actions. It waged a struggle against the President's 
placement of troops under a United Nations (U.N.) flag.139 In that 
respect, President Clinton might be considered less "hawkish" on 
some issues than his Congress. In 1999, the Congressional debate 
on whether to authorize President Clinton's air campaign against 
Yugoslavia included consideration of an important limitation on 
campaigning by barring the use of ground forces. 140 
Ultimately, in the 2000s, the administration of President 
George W. Bush took a large number of extreme positions on the 
executive's constitutional powers relating to war, including the 
global war on terror, commissions, detention and torture, 
eavesdropping, and signing statements. The most striking defeats 
for President Bush included the Supreme Court's decision on 
detention issues in the cases of Hamdan, Rasul, and 
Boumediene. 141 Toward the end of President Bush's tenure, 
135. The Gulf War occasioned certain appropriation issues. Tens of billions 
of dollars to offset the cost of the war came as contributions, principally from 
Saudi Arabia. Initially, the Bush administration tried to handle this outside of 
congressional control. However, Congress, led by Senator Byrd, got the Bush 
administration to treat the funds like Congressional appropriations in terms of 
congressional control. FISHER, supra note 1, at 169. 
136. TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY, supra note 37, at 129-36. 
137. Id. at 31-59. A signing statement is a message from the President 
accompanying his signing a bill into law, which purports to have significance 
akin to a veto message. 
138. Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1556, 1557 (Nov. 5, 1990). 
139. See Hartzman, supra note 39; Tiefer, supra note 2, at 321-22. 
140. Gerald G. Howard, Comment, Combat in Kosovo: Ignoring the War 
Powers Resolution, 38 Hous. L. REv. 261 (2001). 
141. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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Congress renewed the defense of its war powers. Notably, the 
House Judiciary Committee held a scholarly hearing in 2007 on 
Congress's powers to end a war. 142 
A demonstration of Congress's power to enact limitations on 
defense authorizations and appropriations came in the McCain 
amendment forbidding torture. 14 The amendment's dramatic 
legislative history showed the capacity of a Congress-even 
though of the same party as the President-to insist on reaching 
one of the great questions of national security policy (and human 
rights) and to resolve it by the venerable method of the defense 
spending limitation. 144 
Finally, the Obama administration brought further reactions to 
its predecessor. However, as it moved forward with its own 
national security agenda, it drew its own reactions. An early 
instance came in Fall 2009, as consideration took place of General 
McChrystal's proposals to commit large numbers of new troops to 
Afghanistan. Republican congressional leaders called for 
McChrystal to come to Congress and testify, during the Obama 
administration's consideration of his proposal. 145 This may suggest 
that at some point in the tenure of President Obama, he, too, will 
be considered a President less "hawkish" in some respects than 
some elements of his Congresses-like Presidents Adams, 
Madison, Lincoln, McKinley, Truman, and Clinton, among others, 
before him. 
III. CENTRAL IsSUES FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND BASIC 
ANALYSIS 
A. Basic Analysis 
This constitutional history suggests an appropriate mechanism 
or formula for considering constitutional challenges to provisions 
for stepping up a war. That history suggests that Congress may use 
certain kinds of appropriation provisions to impact a war, but that 
the strongest case by far concerns limitation amendments. The 
142. The author's previous article received several mentions and citations. 
See CONGo REc. S1475-78 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2007) (statement of Sen. Arlen 
Specter); JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONGo RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY TO LIMIT U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, at CRS-2 n.4 (2008). 
143. KOH, supra note 37. 
144. David Abramowitz, Taking the Bull by the Horns: Congress and 
International Humanitarian Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 599, 610--13 
(2006). 
145. Tyson, supra note 9. 
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fonnula treats less deferentially the constitutionality of provisions 
to step up a war. 
This distinction has its roots in two phenomena just treated. 
The constitutional text and original intent accord enonnous power 
to Congress through the "No Appropriations" clause, but only as 
used to limit or to constrain military activity. The clause does not 
empower Congress to push for more military activity. And, the 
survey of two centuries of United States experience shows that 
Congress has far more often asserted and vindicated powers to 
limit or constrain a war than to step up a war. Stepping up is not 
absolutely and totally unprecedented, but, especially in tenns of 
provisions intruding on the core of the Commander in Chiefs 
central concerns in the war zone, it does not have a lot of history 
on its side. 
The mechanism or fonnula resembles somewhat Justice 
Jackson's three-zone analysis in Youngstown. 146 In one category 
are the provisions that collide with one of the central issues for the 
Commander in Chief----command, disposition of forces, or 
campaigning. Suppose the congressional provision as to a military 
activity concerns that central issue's core. As a result, a provision 
to step up the war starts with a presumption against 
consti tuti onality. 
Still dealing with one of the central issues, but outside of its 
core, a provision to step up a war would have something less than a 
presumption against it-rather, a doubt about its constitutionality. 
For example, Congress might enact provisions for the military to 
move more forces into countries bordering Afghanistan but that are 
not part of the conflict, like Uzbekistan. 147 Assume the 
Commander in Chief disagrees with this disposition of forces. He 
does not call it an outright interference with the war, but he 
considers it excessive and unduly expensive. 148 Congress 
nevertheless passes it to step up the threat of military action on the 
enemy in Afghanistan. 
Such a provision would come with doubt of some weight about 
constitutionality-less than a presumption against it, but still 
somewhat. The provision deals with one of the central issues-
disposition of forces-and does so in time of war. However, the 
146. See supra note 59. 
147. For the significance of Uzbekistan to the United States, see RASHID, 
supra note 13, at 161-65. 
148. Assume that the President does not maintain that a disposition of forces 
in this way would drain strength from the war zone itself, which raises a 
different question. Rather, Congress provides additional funding and arranges 
for compensating expansion of U.S. forces. 
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provision is outside the core. It does not apply in the zone of 
combat but rather to other neighboring countries. 
At the other extreme, for a shared issue, a provision to step up 
a war may start without a presumption of unconstitutionality or 
even a strong doubt of constitutionality. Perhaps, as a provision to 
step up a war, it would just deserve a searching consideration. On 
the one hand, such a provision draws on an Article I congressional 
power and a history of congressional action. On the other, it is still 
not a provision to limit the war, and hence it warrants some 
suspicion. 
Congress might enact a provision for opium poppy eradication. 
Also, Congress would appropriate funds to pay contracting firms to 
perform this task. Oversight would come from the civilian agency 
that has overseen poppy eradication and other anti-drug efforts in 
the past, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs. Thus, it would primarily be a task 
for civilians, rather than for the military in its campaigns. 
This is a shared issue: it implicates Congress's Article I 
powers, but it does not collide directly with the President's role in 
command, disposition of troops, or campaigning. The provision 
aims to step up the war, not to limit or constrain it. Hence it starts 
with a clean slate or, at most, a plain doubt-not a presumption or 
a material doubt, just a doubt. That does not completely resolve the 
issue. Rather, the specifics of the issue receive scrutiny. After all, 
in a general sense, the provision takes a more aggressive, albeit 
controversial, stance toward an outlawed practice harmful to the 
world and financially valuable to the Taliban. 149 The constitutional 
analyst looks back for historical examples and constitutional 
support for Congress ordering this. ISO 
Overall, this categorizing mechanism or formula is suggestive 
rather than mandatory. Other ways could draw legitimately on the 
previous constitutional history. The goal remains weighing the 
balance of constitutional powers, and the use of important 
historical precedents, in ways that will present and apply as much 
factually attuned nuance as possible. Others might imagine a 
constitutional analysis that employs more abstract notions or 
emphasizes whatever bits and pieces of court opinions have some 
relevance. This mechanism mobilizes the history on the basis that 
149. As throughout, the author takes no position on policy issues. 
Hypothetical examples are posed only to illustrate the constitutional analysis. 
And, of course, the author does not speak for his Commission or any other 
member thereof. 
150. Lobel, supra note 20. For an in-depth treatment of this hypothetical, see 
infra Part IV. 
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the constitutional lines arise out of historical accretion of the 
interaction of the political branches in each particular focused 
subject area. 
B. Specifics of Commander in Chief Issues 
To distill this constitutional history into some functional 
methods of analysis requires, fIrst, an establishment of the central 
Commander in Chief issues, and their cores, before applying in a 
later section, to an analysis of two provisions. One of these two 
provisions would charter an intrusive committee to influence 
command; another would direct land action against sanctuaries 
over the border in Pakistan. Looking at the relation of issues to the 
Commander in Chief power, one group of issues is central: 
command, disposition of forces, and campaigning. For this central 
group, in its core the President can make a stronger case for 
asserting the Commander in Chief clause against legislative 
intrusion. 
A number of Supreme Court opinions, among other sources of 
law, have summed up the Commander in Chief power in terms 
matching the central issues. For each of these, a hypothetical can 
demonstrate the existence of a core in which, presumptively, 
Congress may not constitutionally direct the President. However, 
historically, particular examples and doctrinal treatments show that 
Congress can enact valid legislation even as to these central areas 
in their noncore or ambiguous aspects. 
1. Command 
Congress must respect, at the core of the central issue of 
command,151 the "superintendence principle,,,152 namely, as Justice 
Jackson put it, that the Commander in Chief clause "undoubted~ 
puts the Nation's armed forces under presidential command."1 
So, for example, in the Afghanistan war, the "hawkish" 
congressional opposition might want to fInd the most kindred 
"hawkish" high military fIgure, say, the head of the Central 
Command. Congress might desire to enact a provision to make him 
independent of the chain of command, and thereby to intensify the 
war. Such a provision would amount to a thrust by Congress 
151. The Tenure of Office Act illustrates Congress attempting to tamper with 
this central issue. See supra note 115. 
152. Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 1102-05. 
153. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
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directly at the very core of this central concern of the Commander 
in Chief. 
As to this central issue but outside its core, Congress has much 
to say. Congress has legislated the overall structure of the milita~ 
establishment from George Washington's presidency to today. I 't 
In the twentieth century, after World War II, Congress finally 
faced the problem that no military figure coordinated the Army and 
the Navy. This had become an intolerable problem when the land 
and sea forces did not coordinate intelligence, leading to the awful 
surprise of Pearl Harbor, and did not always effectively coordinate 
their land-sea operations. 155 
So, Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947 and 
the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, creating the 
Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
respectively.156 Of note,157 Congress provided that the Secretary of 
Defense, not the President, gave or transmitted commands to the 
military commanders, a critical aspect of the chain of command. 158 
A decade later, Congress enacted the Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958, introducing the concept of unified and 
specified combatant commands that would combine forces from 
the different services. 159 Finally, in 1986, Congress enacted the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, creating joint commands. 160 
In the 201 Os, the United States fights two wars: a war in 
Afghanistan and a (diminishing role in) a war in Iraq. For both 
wars, American forces in-theatre fight under a single unified 
Central Command coordinating all the services, as Congress 
prescribed by Goldwater-Nichols. 161 As Congress intended, 
Central Command means the in-theatre fighting forces have 
achieved vastly improved unity and coordination of action. 
Presidents could not have achieved this with the pre-statutory 
arrangement of independent military services. In other words, 
Congress has conducted 60 years of relatively successful statutory 
154. It has altered statutorily the top army command. In the 1800s, this varied 
between the general with the most seniority and the general chosen by the 
President. Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 957-61. 
155. Paul M. Murphy & William M. Koenig, Whither Goldwater-Nichols?, 
43 NAVALL. REv. 183,184 (1996). 
156. Id. at 185-86. 
157. Hartzman, supra note 39; Lobel, supra note 4, at 412 n.65. 
158. Lobel, supra note 4, at 412 n.65. 
159. Id. at 187. 
160. /d. at 187-93. 
161. Congress's strictures in this regard culminated in the Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, undoubtedly the 
boldest command reorganizing of the era. Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992; see 
Murphy & Koenig, supra note 155. 
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structuring of the concept of a central command, without 
constitutional resistance by the executive. The time for arguing that 
Congress does not have the power to do so has long passed. 
By and large, Presidents must put up with some degree of 
intrusive oversight treatment. Another issue concerning command 
may arise from congressional oversight of a war. Faced with a 
highly intrusive congressional investigation of the conduct of a 
war, the President might argue that such oversight interferes with 
his commanders' obedience to commands from him. 
Regarding command, the tension about what raises 
constitutional doubt shows up in one of the major constitutional 
clashes of the Clinton administration. Congress sought to limit, 162 
and President Clinton stood by his power Of,163 having American 
troops serve under a U.N. commander. l64 A Justice Department 
opinion of much interest designated as unconstitutional a law 
barring the President from making such a U.N. command 
arrangement. 165 
Observers recognized important counterarguments to the 
Justice Department position on a constitutionally mandated option 
for the President to have the choice of a U.N. command. The 
Justice Department "opinion did not cite, let alone discuss, 
Youngstown.,,166 Addressing that key opinion would have required 
dealing with how Youngstown puts the President's powers at their 
lowest ebb, where the President refuses to obey an express statute 
162. The Republican Congress tapped into its political base's dislike for the 
United Nations. That base's blame of AWOL United Nations forces for the 
trapping of American soldiers during the Somalia intervention was portrayed by 
the movie Black Hawk Down. 
163. In practice, President Clinton effectively conceded the practical issue, 
for purposes of gaining public acceptance. He emphasized that he would put 
American troops for the Bosnia deployment under an American general and a 
NATO structure, not under the objected-to U.N. command. The word ''NATO'' 
appeared 10 times in President Clinton's address about the commitment (not 
counting the additional multiple mentions of "European allies"), while the words 
"United Nations" appeared only once to make a contrast. The only mention of 
the U.N. was that "American troops will take their orders from the American 
general who commands NATO .... [U]nlike the U.N. forces, they will have the 
authority to respond immediately." If We're Not There, NATO Will Not Be ... 
Peace Will Col/apse, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1995, at A8 (text of President's 
address). President Clinton twice noted the command structure for American 
forces: that they were "under the command of an American general" and "will 
take their orders from the American general." Id. 
164. Tiefer, supra note 2, at 321-22. 
165. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations 
Operational or Tactical Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182 (1996). 
166. Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 1091-
92. 
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against U.N. command. A learned opinion by the Bar Association 
of the City of New York extensively canvassed the law and history 
and came to a more neutral outcome than the Justice 
Department. 167 Yet, in any event, Congress took only a restraining 
or limiting position. Consistent with the negative "No 
Appropriations" clause, it told Presidents that they cannot put 
forces under U.N. command. Congress did not purport to tell 
Presidents affirmatively, out of all the possible command 
arrangements, that they must now implement one particular 
arrangement for one particular conflict. 
2. Disposition of Forces 
A second central issue consists of the disposition of forces in 
the field. In the Afghanistan war, taking the extreme example, 
Congress cannot direct the President to shift additional forces from 
northern to southern Afghanistan, even though a congressional 
opposition might want to make him do that to intensify the war 
further. However, even as to this central issue for the Commander 
in Chief of the disposition of forces, Congress has had much to say 
about a range of noncore issues. It has spoken often on the 
disposition of forces in peacetime and on the eve of war168 and has 
cut off funds for the military to go into countries neighboring a war 
zone. 169 
For example, in 1940 President Franklin Roosevelt staked his 
ability to act in the European war, resolving one of the most 
important modem constitutional disputes about the disposition of 
forces. 170 Roosevelt succeeded in getting the nation's first 
peacetime draft through Congress by the bare margin of a single 
167. Hartzman, supra note 39 (concluding that although Congress would act 
most unwisely, nevertheless, Congress would not act unconstitutionally in 
enacting such a provision because of the concurrent nature of Congress's powers 
to make rules for the military). 
168. Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, 
and the United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 635-36 (1993) (discussing the "Great 
Debate" in the Senate over deploying troops to Europe in the creation of 
NATO). 
169. Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-171, 
§ 3( e), 83 Stat. 469, 487 (1969) (cutting off funds for land operations in Laos 
and Cambodia, the neighbors of Vietnam). 
170. Roosevelt distinguished between preparedness, with broad public 
support, and military intervention in the European war, opposed by major parts 
of the public. Republicans, and kindred Democrats, with an isolationist bent 
looked for legislative ways not to have the naked stance of opposing 
preparedness, but rather to support legislative action to keep America out of the 
war. Tiefer, supra note 2, at 303. 
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vote in the House. He did so only by accepting a famous condition 
of the opposition in Congress: that no draftees be stationed outside 
of the Western Hemisphere or the United States. 171 
In the spring of 1941, Roosevelt determined to send U.S. 
troops to Iceland, outside the Western Hemisphere. 172 However, he 
obeyed the letter of the congressional provision about 
deployments. 173 This has continued to today as an important 
precedent about what Congress may do vis-a-vis the Commander 
in Chief. 
3. Military Campaigning 
A third central issue consists of military campaigning. As the 
Afghanistan war goes forward, a "hawkish" congressional 
opposition might want to step up the war's intensity. As a blunt 
approach, they might desire to enact a mandate for a full-fledged 
war throughout the country on a counter-insurgency mission 
against even local, dispersed, low-level Taliban activity. But, apart 
from simply making more or different resources available, a 
Congress attempting to dictate the military campaign mission in 
particular campaigns would intrude on the very core of this central 
Issue. 
However, Congress has much to say about campaigning 
outside that core of the issue. An example consists of President 
Clinton's 1999 campaign against Serbia, to stop its occupation of 
KoSOVO. 174 Congress considered authorizing legislation for a 
bombing campaign,175 much as it had for the earlier dispatching of 
171. The "United States" included its territory and possessions, so stationing 
troops in the Philippines was allowed. See Selective Service and Training Act of 
1940, ch. 720, § 3(e), 54 Stat. 885, 886. 
172. Cooper, supra note 123 (citing SCHLESINGER, supra note 130). He did 
this as part of an overall effort in which the U.S. took over from Britain parts of 
the Battle of the Atlantic with Germany. His action was obviously at odds with 
the spirit of the proviso to keep draftees within the Western Hemisphere and out 
of the war zone. 
173. He deployed only half the number of troops he wanted, and these 
consisted of a mix of Marines (all volunteers, of course, not draftees) and 
statutorily eligible Army forces (those who were volunteers, not draftees). See 
Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 1049-50. 
174. Geoffrey S. Com, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the 
War Powers Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1149 (2001) (discussing the 
Kosovo bombing campaigns and how they reflect the breakdown of the War 
Powers Resolution in relation to such controversies). 
175. Louis Fisher, Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse, 3 
u.c. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'y 107, 129-37 (1997). 
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peacekeeping troops to Bosnia after the Dayton Accords. 176 As in 
the earlier period, the conuessional action had considerable 
significance for war powers. I 
The Kosovo debate notably featured amendments to go beyond 
simply authorizing an air campaign and to expressly forbid 
supporting it by ground troops. By most definitions this would 
constrain the type or scope of campaigning.178 The debates over 
the scope of campaigning as to Kosovo echoed longstanding 
themes in constitutional history. Chief Justice John Marshall's 
Supreme Court expounded how Congress could and did decide the 
type of naval campaign authorized in the limited Quasi-War with 
France of the 1790s. As the Court explained, nations could wage 
either "perfect" (unlimited) or "imperfect" (limited) wars, and 
Congress made that decision in authorizing war. 179 Moreover, in 
the course of the war, Congress could, and did, change the 
authorized ~e of naval campaign by changing the statutory 
authorization. 80 
This kind of issue, more or less, even arose three days after the 
9/11 terrorist attack. The carefully worded drafting of that 
September 14, 2001 congressional resolution for the 
"Authorization of Military Force,,181 clearly reflects a compromise 
in those three days on many points, notably between President 
Bush's sweepingly empowering initial proposal and the narrower 
focus of the leadership of the then-Democratic Senate, 1 82 
particularly by not authorizing hostilities with Iraq. 183 
176. This was notwithstanding its failure to produce a bicameral enactment. 
See Tiefer, War Decisions, supra note 40, at 16 (describing the Chadha 
requirements of bicameralism and presentment for congressional actions). 
177. !d. 
178. Id. Moreover, earlier in the Clinton administration, in response to the ill-
fated American intervention in Somalia, Congress adopted the Byrd and 
Kempthorne Amendments, which required American troops to leave that 
country by a 1994 deadline and not to return unless Congress approved. For the 
background of the Byrd and Kempthorne Amendments, see Rosen, supra note 
91, at 11 n.53. 
179. Lobel, supra note 4, at 423-30 (discussing the Supreme Court's 
decision in Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800)). 
180. !d. 
181. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub L. No. 107-140, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001); see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 44. 
182. The more cautiously drafted compromise version adopted by Congress 
no longer authorized hostilities with countries having no share in 9/11. TIEFER, 
supra note 42, at 258-59; Abramowitz, supra note 44, at 74. 
183. The loose original White House proposal was printed in the 
Congressional Record by Senator Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.). 147 CONGo REc. 
S9950-52 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2001). 
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In sum, constitutional arguments and historic examples present 
three central issues of Presidential war powers and congressional 
action. This sets the stage for analyzing concrete provisions that a 
"hawkish" Congress might enact. 
IV . ANALYSIS: EXAMPLES OF WHAT A "HAWKISH" CONGRESS 
MIGHT Do 
This Article now examines a series of fuller analyses of 
specific hypothetical provisions by which a "hawkish" Congress 
could push the President to step up the Afghanistan war. Two of 
these, in this Part, collide with two of the executive's central 
issues: a law directing the President to attack border sanctuaries, 
which collides with the core of the campaigning power; and an 
intrusive congressional oversight committee focused on war 
decisions, which collides with the periphery of the power of 
command. Then this Part discusses issues regarding a war zone 
policy of poppy eradication, and regarding the assertion of 
presidential power to impound-to refuse to spend-war 
appropriations. 
A. The Power of Campaigning, Viewed Through the Example of 
Directing Presidents to Attack Border "Sanctuaries ,,184 
For many years, the Afghanistan Taliban have taken advantage 
of the border shared with Pakistan as a relatively safe haven or 
refuge. In 2001-2002, American forces allied with Afghan 
elements overthrew the Taliban government of Afghanistan and 
forced the Taliban out of the country. At that time, to escape, the 
leadership of both the Afghanistan Taliban and Al Qaeda fled 
across the border into Pakistan. Since then, the Taliban have used 
their Pakistan refuge as a base to build up strength and to support a 
move back into Afghanistan. I85 
Moreover, the Taliban continueI86 to derive vital support from 
their relatively secure safe havens or refuges and allied groups over 
184. For further discussion on this topic, see, for example, JONES, supra note 
13; RASHID, supra note 13. 
185. JONES, supra note 13, at 95-108. 
186. Even in the years from 2005 on, the Taliban top leadership remained in 
those areas of Pakistan near the border and under minimal control by the 
government in Karachi. These areas are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
and the Northwest Frontier Provinces. In these areas of Pakistan, the central 
government has little control. Effectively, local elements share control of the 
region, particularly the Pakistani Taliban, who have affinities with the Afghani 
Taliban. 
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the border. 187 The United States sufficiently respects the border, 
and whatever other tactics the Taliban uses, to not conduct a 
substantial incursion or occupation with regular army forces, nor to 
treat the area as a tarret for regular Air Force bombing campaigns 
like Serbia in 1999. 18 
How to think of such an incursion is a policy debate, not a legal 
one, and this Article does not address the policy issue at all. 
Rather, this Article posits a plausible hypothetical; someday the 
changing relationships among Pakistan, the Taliban, and the 
United States may make an incursion not entirely unthinkable, 
although still highly debatable. Meanwhile, assume that elections 
of the 201 Os have strengthened in Congress a coalition of 
"hawkish" Republicans and Democrats. Now Congress contrasts 
with a "less hawkish" President, who for various policy 
considerations refrains from various ways of stepping up the war. 
The congressional "hawks" find some ways of stepping up the 
war supported by responsible military and political figures (albeit 
not by the presidential administration). Moreover, their political 
base supports them on some of these ways of stepping up the 
war.189 Part of the debate-not necessarily as major as the policy 
issues-would include Congress's dispute with the President about 
constitutional justifications, so as to blunt the charge that Congress 
transgresses the Commander in Chief's prerogatives. Certain 
conditions would create the possibility of a proposal for a cross-
border incursion to move forward toward enactment, in the face of 
'd . I .. 190 presl entia opposItion. 
187. According to public sources, the United States has used pilotless drones 
to target Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership in the border areas. Also, the United 
States obtained some limited cooperation from the government of Pakistan, 
which aided in the effort against Al Qaeda leadership. 
188. JONES, supra note 13, at 100-01. 
189. Although in this instance the congressional "hawks" push the action, the 
political situation has some resemblances to when "less hawkish" congressional 
groups have pushed for provisions that step down a war. These include the 
Vietnam cut-offs, the Boland Amendments, and the congressional effort in 
2007-2008 to enact an Iraq drawdown. 
190. As an example of such conditions, suppose that the Pakistani 
government and public indicate, for diverse reasons, that they would no longer 
take as dim a view of cross-border incursions in particular areas where the 
Afghanistan Taliban and its allies have largely taken over and inflicted harm on 
Pakistan. And, suppose some influential elements of the American military 
believe that a cross-border incursion would deeply impair the Taliban. For a 
discussion on the strength of the Pakistani Taliban in the border regions, see 
generally RASHID, supra note 13, at 402-08. 
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To raise the question squarely, assume Congress rejects all 
presidential compromises that would dilute the provision.l9l 
Instead, Congress enacts its provision undiluted, aboard the annual 
defense authorization or appropriation. In The provision steps up 
the war by making mandatory appropriations available. And, it 
further prescribes that the military "shall" undertake an incursion 
into Taliban border sanctuaries in Pakistan. To show deference to 
the Commander in Chief, the provision leaves to him the decisions 
as to the incursion about who, what, when, how, and how long-
almost everything except "whether." 
1. The Cambodia and Laos Analogy 
Such a provision to step up the war, by mandating a cross-
border incursion, implicates one of the central issues for the 
Commander in Chief, his control over campaigning. Such a 
provision implicates that issue at its core. It does not dilute the 
impact by, for example, laying down some general rules for cross-
border operations, the way the Geneva Conventions lay down 
some general rules for detention or the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
lays down general rules for unified commands.193 This provision 
lays down no general rule at all but dictates about campaigning in 
this specific location in this specific theatre of war at this specific 
time. And, it mandates use of both types of military arms-ground 
and air forces alike. 
A search for a historical analogy leads straight to President 
Nixon's incursions into Laos and Cambodia. These occurred 
without congressional authorization (apart from the general 
191. Normally, Presidents seek with some success to deflect congressional 
attempts to direct their war-fighting activities. In this case, the President might 
seek to preempt legislation of an unwanted kind by allowing a congressional 
provision for a cross-border operation in the form of a "sense-of-the-Congress 
provision." Or, the President might reduce his opposition by proposing a 
provision providing that the President could defer operations if he certified that 
to do so would be against the national interest. Finally, the President might step 
up the effort in the border areas, without going as far as an incursion. In a classic 
example, President Kennedy defused a controversy over a mandatory 
appropriation for a plane procurement he had threatened to impound, by saying 
he would accept the appropriation so long as it was discretionary rather than 
mandatory. See Stanton, supra note 34, at 13. 
192. For the system of annual authorizations and appropriations, see BANKS 
& RA YEN-HANSEN, supra note 1. 
193. Another form of dilution is simply to not go up to the limit of what a 
court has previously struck down. See Mario L. Barnes & F. Greg Bowman, 
Entering Unprecedented Terrain: Charting a Method to Reduce Madness in 
Post-9/JJ Power and Rights Conflicts, 62 U. MIAMI L. REv. 365, 411-12 
(2008). 
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authority cited for the Vietnam War, namely, the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution of 1964).194 Mainly, like the Afghanistan hypothetical, 
and like examples from wars even further back,195 those supporting 
the incursions into Cambodia and Laos appealed to the public by a 
popular argument: we should not let the enemy kill American and 
allied soldiers by operating out of "sanctuaries. ,,196 
Then-Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist-Iater 
Chief Justice-and Secretary of State William Rogers provided the 
legal justification for President Nixon's Cambodia incursion 
without specific congressional authorization. 197 Rehnquist drew on 
past discussions of the Commander in Chief power, in general, and 
his responsibility for military campaigns, in particular. Congress 
responded by cutting off funds for such incursions. These cut-off 
provisions dramatized Congress's decision in the 1970s to restore 
its powers in the national security context. 198 
Returning to the hypothetical, the Commander in Chief does not 
seek to widen the Afghanistan war. He protests Congress's intrusion 
by so much more than a mere negative cut-off appropriation 
limitation. He protests Congress telling him whether to campaign, in 
many aspects: whether to spend money and to deploy forces, rather 
than save the money and not deploy the forces; whether to put his 
forces into a region or to keep them out; and whether to take on the 
194. For a discussion of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, see Ely, The American 
War in Indochina, Part I, supra note 36, at 884-97. 
195. During the Korean War, proponents of a more vigorous military effort 
complained that the Communist side's military benefitted from "sanctuaries" in 
Manchuria, and that their aircraft used bases across the Korean border as 
"sanctuaries." MacArthur discussed this view in his famous speech before a 
joint session of Congress: "The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the 
fact that its military action was confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that 
nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full 
naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected 
from such attack and devastation." MacArthur's Speeches: "Old Soldiers Never 
Die," PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlameximacarthur/filmmore/reference/ 
primary/macspeech05.html (last visited Oct. 18,2010) (emphasis added). 
196. The Cambodian incursion had ulterior reasons hidden from the public. 
Similarly, some of those allied with congressional hawks might have a national 
security justification for a cross-border incursion, such as a need to prop up the 
Pakistani government. 
197. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Honorable Charles W. Colson, Special Counsel 
to the President, Re: The President and the War Power: South Vietnam and the 
Cambodian Sanctuaries (May 22, 1970), reprinted in William H. Rehnquist, The 
Constitutional Issues-Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 628 (1970); 
see William Rogers, The Constitutionality o/the Cambodian Incursion, in 3 THE 
VIElNAM WAR. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE WIDENING CONTEXT 175, 176 
(R. Falk ed., 1972). 
198. FRANCK & WE1SBAND, supra note 134, at 13-33. 
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enemy in that region besides others. More broadly, Congress has 
dictated to him regardless of whether this particular incursion fits 
with his overall strategy for the war. Especially, Congress has forced 
his hand irrespective of whether it fits the overall war strategy to be 
going deeper into the war by an incursion that expands the war, 
rather than stabilizing or drawing down. 199 
2. Other Analysis 
Nor does the congressional action in ordering a cross-border 
operation correspond to one of the established "Declare War" 
categories of Congress authorizing, but not controlling, the use of 
force?OO When Congress declares or authorizes war, Congress 
creates the legal authority for the war to proceed, but leaves to the 
Commander in Chief, within limitations, the decision of the strategy 
for the war.201 To put it differently, Congress could merely provide 
discretionary appropriations and a discretionary authorization, 
without directing a cross-border incursion. Congress could let the 
Commander in Chief decide whether the incursion fits the overall 
strategy for the war. Each branch would have its separate role. 
On the other hand, a mandated stepping-up of the war to go 
after border sanctuaries differs greatly from Congress declaring or 
authorizing war pursuant to the "Declare War" clause.202 For 
Congress to order an operation such as an incursion, in the midst of 
a previously authorized war, intrudes deep into the Commander in 
Chiefs command role. To be sure, some in-between or hybrid 
examples would challenge this neat dichotomy between what 
Congress can and cannot do in terms of indicating to the President 
199. Congress might well make the argument that it chooses to go after 
sanctuaries in order to shorten the war, reduce casualties, and facilitate a 
drawdown. For example, President Nixon justified the Laos and Cambodia 
incursions that way. To be sure, anyone urging an incursion, whether Congress 
or the President, will make that kind of argument, and different segments of the 
public may be more or less responsive to it. In simple terms of legal analysis, 
though, the difference between a restrictive appropriation rider, like a cut-off 
after a deadline, and a "step-up" rider, like a mandated incursion, is in how the 
provision operates, not in debatable calculations of its ultimate strategic impact. 
A restrictive appropriation rider triggers the potent "No Appropriations" clause, 
because it stops the President from obtaining funding from the Treasury for an 
action. A mandated incursion rider directs the President to obtain such funding. 
However, their debatable strategic implications do not enter into this distinction. 
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
201. The President's situation in this hypothetical is a little like Franklin 
Roosevelt's in 1942, when deciding how much to push against Germany and 
how much to push against Japan. In either situation, the Commander in Chief 
retains complete authority to decide how to conduct campaigns during wartime. 
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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that he should deal with a cross-border enemy sanctuary.203 Even 
so, a vital distinction would still apply in congressional provisions 
between restrictive versus expansive, and discretionary versus 
mandatory provisions. 
In terms of campaigning, Congress would be ordering that the 
military conduct a specific campaign. Congress would establish a 
kind of unfiltered relationship with the military of giving them 
campaign direction, regardless of presidential views. 
To be sure, as noted, Congress could leave much discretion to 
the President about the who, what, when, how, and how long of the 
incursion. Some in-between or hybrid examples would challenge 
this neat dichotomy. Still, the significance of this position shows in 
applying it to historic "less hawkish" Presidents and "more 
hawkish" Congresses. By this formulation, a more powerful group 
of "War Hawks" in Congress could not have directed a more 
reluctant President Madison to invade Canada; a powerful group of 
imperialist-minded congressmen could not have directed a more 
reluctant President McKinley to take the Philippines; and a rabidly 
hawkish group of congressmen during the Korean War could not 
have directed a reluctant President Truman to bomb Manchuria. 
B. Example: Intrusive Oversight of Command 
1. Specific Mechanism 
Ordinarily, Congress uses its standing committees to conduct 
oversight of the subjects within their jurisdiction?04 As to military 
203. In light of the Quasi-War of 1798, Congress has flexibility in declaring 
or authorizing a war, and in giving directions about its scope. Arguably, 
Congress could declare war on a dominant, if non-state, element across the 
border in Pakistan, and thereby oblige the President to go wage a war with that 
element. Certainly the authorization of war by Congress could restrict the 
President to waging only an air war or only a ground war, but Congress would 
go much farther in trying to mandate that the President wage only a ground war. 
Congress could authorize the President to fight those cross-border elements, and 
a President who disregarded that authorization would be on thin ice. However, a 
President could conscientiously wage a different war than Congress had in 
mind-by not sending regular troops in an incursion, for example. The President 
would couple stepped-up air operations with stepped-up Special Forces raids. 
Although Congress would want more, the President could claim, with some 
justice, that he had carried out the authorization of war within his own 
discretionary control over the scale and nature of campaigning. 
204. For military matters, the armed services committees, and perhaps the 
defense appropriations subcommittees, would have the main oversight 
responsibility. Other committees might help. The government operations 
committees, for example, have government-wide jurisdiction and may conduct 
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operations, since World War II Congress has established the 
annual defense authorization bill as a means to empower its armed 
services committees to conduct military oversight.205 In wartime, 
these armed services committees will call on the top civilian 
defense figures, and sometimes also the highest military figures, to 
discuss issues related to the war. The committees are supposed to 
devote themselves to policy issues, not to the review of purely 
military decisions. As part of this limitation, only very rarely do 
the committees call upon the subordinate military officers closer to 
field units in the theatre of war. In particular, committees rarely 
call on such field commanders to take part in a public hearing 
process of criticism or advice on their conduct of purely military 
operations.z°6 Such a process would have the potential to push 
alternatives to presidential direction. 
However, a "hawkish" majority in Congress could make the 
strategic decision to step up the war by means of a powerful forum 
to give criticism or advice directly to the military commanders in 
the field about just such stepping up. Because the majority party 
has the greater influence over committee establishment and 
appointment, this heightened influence would matter most if the 
opposition party held the majority. Still, it would matter some, 
particularly in the Senate,207 even if the President's party held the 
majority, assuming those of "hawkish" views had a majority 
counting supporters in both parties. The committees would take 
special advantage of latent "hawkish" views of the military that 
would be common among the majority. The "hawks" could pursue 
several special goals. First, they could set up a Select Committee 
on the War in Afghanistan, with membership coming from the top 
oversight of a war. These oversight committees obey certain measures of 
restraint. 
205. See generally BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note l. 
206. For example, Congress did not hold hearings about the single greatest 
disappointment in the otherwise strikingly successful 2001-2002 military 
campaign in Afghanistan: the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden at Tora 
Bora. A search of the LexisNexis database for Committee Hearing Transcripts 
for "Tora Bora wl100 hearing" found many mentions in Administration press 
briefings but not any hearings with questions for generals. 
207. In the Senate, when the parties have a close balance, the majority 
leadership, even if they are of the President's party, must bend to powerful 
bipartisan sentiment in such matters. In a recent example, the Republican 
Congress of the 2000s created a 9111 commission, even though it might have 
criticized some of the Bush administration's inadequacies prior to 9/11. Public 
sentiment demonstrating a strong desire for such a commission led to its 
creation, notwithstanding some opposing sentiment from the majority party in 
Congress. 
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"hawkish" figures on and off the anned services committee?08 
This would give the "hawks" a star role. The Select Committee 
could have power to subpoena military figures for hearings, with a 
congressional expectation that they will do so regardless of the 
President's displeasure with that approach. 
Furthennore, the committee would schedule non-public 
meetings (in Washington and on in-theatre trips) with key figures 
regardless of their amenability to public hearings.209 Also, the 
anned services and defense appropriation committees could break 
the large lump-sum appropriations usually used to pay for wars 
into smaller pieces that make it easier for Congress to manipulate 
the purse strings.2JO The "hawks" in the House and Senate would 
assure that the Select Committee's regorts would influence or 
shape the appropriations for the war? 1 In effect, the fight for 
congressional influence over the war would go up, from the 
consensus-oriented anned services committees, to more "hawkish" 
and radical bodies. 
The purpose of the Special Committee would include direction 
of the maximum adverse attention to every aspect of the 
President's war efforts criticized by the "hawkish" parts of 
Congress and the pUblic.212 Such oversight would make it more 
difficult for the administration to pursue its course. Beyond 
directing the public's attention, such an effort might aim at 
persuading or obliging the administration to change course in the 
desired direction to some degree. It would direct a stream of 
proposals, some in public hearings, some in private meetings, 
expecting that to the extent the administration could not defend its 
course of action, it must adopt some of the most popular measures. 
208. The House and Senate could set these up in each chamber or have a 
joint committee. For simplicity in description, it will be assumed that just one 
chamber sets one up. 
209. Those seen in meetings might include the National Security Adviser, 
generals with assignments in the field rather than their superiors, ambassadors to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and those on field trips to Afghanistan (high officials 
in that government). 
210. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 1, at 69-70. 
211. The nominations for defense posts that supervise aspects of the war, 
such as the Secretary of the Army, require the Senate to decide upon 
confirmation. Prior to Senate vote, the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
must vote on reporting the nomination favorably. The Senate could signal, by a 
resolution saying so, that it will give weight, in deciding on such confirmation, 
on the views of the committee on the war. 
212. Had such an effort occurred during the Vietnam War-say, by war-
skeptics in 1967-68-it would have gone into the poor strategy, the unreliable 
and corrupt local government, the concealed-cost projects, the ineffectiveness of 
the bombing campaign, the intelligence failures, the devastating impact of the 
Tet Offensive, and so on. 
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2. MacArthur and Civil War Inquiries 
No matter what Congress does in this context, it draws on the 
strong support in the Framers' original intent for Congress to 
conduct oversight. A powerful series of precedents includes review 
of problematic issues in wars.213 Of course, Congress throughout 
the nation's history has contributed invaluably by oversight, in 
wartime as well as peacetime, of waste, fraud, and abuse. The 
classic example of such inquiry was the Truman Committee during 
World War 11.214 
Of the great modem examples of high-level congressional 
oversight of the conduct of military action itself, the MacArthur 
Inquiry of 1951 stands out as involving an unrivaled review of 
war-fighting strategy,215 altho~ there are other fabled examples 
such as the Fulbright hearings 6 and the "national commitments" 
report reacting to the Vietnam War.217 In the 1951 example, 
President Truman had relieved General Douglas MacArthur as 
commander in the Korean War.218 The Senate arranged lengthy 
hearings about MacArthur's strategic views. Committee witnesses 
included the secretaries of the State and Defense departments, the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs, and an 
array of other top military and other officials.219 
That inquiry probed deeply into the highest levels of military 
strategy. These included MacArthur's desires, as a historian 
summarizes, of "lifting restrictions on bombing Chinese territory, 
imposing a naval blockade against the China coast, and putting the 
troops of Chiang Kai-shek in the battle against the 'Red 
Chinese. ",220 
213. The very first congressional investigation consisted of a select House 
committee looking into a disastrous battle with Indians of the Ohio Valley. 
George C. Chalou, St. Clair's Defeat, 1792, in CONGRESS INVESTIGATES, 1792-
1974, at 1 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Bruns eds., 1975). 
214. Theodore Wilson, The Truman Committee, 1941, in CONGRESS 
INVESTIGATES, 1792-1974, supra note 213, at 327. 
215. John Edward Wiltz, The MacArthur 1nquiry, 1951, in CONGRESS 
INVESTIGATES, 1792-1974, supra note 213, at 385. 
216. Louis Fisher, War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional 
Abdication, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 7, 24-25 (2000); Reinstein & 
Silverglate, supra note 14. For Senator Fulbright's own insightful reflections on 
his historic hearings, see generally J. William Fulbright, Foreword to GLENNON, 
supra note 1, at xiii n.2. 
217. GLENNON, supra note 1, at 88,180. 
218. He did so after MacArthur publicly espoused a very different and far 
more militant strategy than the administration's as to how the United States 
should conduct the Korean War and other contemporary efforts. 
219. Tiefer, supra note 2, at 339. 
220. Wilson, supra note 214, at 397. 
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History has viewed the MacArthur Inquiry benignly, not 
questioning its constitutionality. The leading historian, asking 
rhetorically "whether the MacArthur inquiry served any useful 
purpose," declared, "[t]he answer is an unqualified yes ... the 
inquiry defused the MacArthur controversy," including largely 
laying: to rest MacArthur's proposals for escalating the Korean 
War. 22 I 
In contrast, a President opposing the most intrusive 
congressional oversight of the Afghanistan war may cite the most 
criticized instance of intrusive wartime oversight in all of U.S. 
history, namely, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
during the Civil War.222 The Joint Committee constantly brought 
before it commanders in the field and grilled them on their recent 
military efforts, from commanders at particular battles all the way 
up to Ulysses S. Grant.223 At one point it met with the President 
and his whole Cabinet as part of a general pattern in which no one, 
not President Lincoln and certainly not Secretary of War Stanton, 
said "no" to them. This suggests the possible acquisition by the 
Joint Committee of influence in the chain of command?24 
Moreover, the Joint Committee kept up an extensive stream of 
military advice to Lincoln. 
Even so, Lincoln's response to advice with "typical light irony" 
showed that "Lincoln was not going to take seriously the advice 
they kept urging on him.,,225 While critics attributed to Lincoln 
some very negative views of the Joint Committee, "Lincoln never 
committed such thoughts to paper himself, nor does he ever seem 
to have allowed the committee to usurp his constitutional powers 
as Commander in Chief.,,226 Further limiting its influence, although 
a few generals supported the committee, was the fact that "[m]ost 
of the military, however, bitterly resented the committee's 
investigations as unwarranted and totally undeserved 
interference. ,,227 So this committee did not find military support for 
what it wanted to do, and thereby lacked what would potentially be 
the main tool to shape a strategy deviating from the President's. 
221. !d. at 423. 
222. See TAP, supra note 62; Elisabeth Joan Doyle, The Conduct of the War, 
1861, in CONGRESS INVESTIGATES, 1792-1974, supra note 213, at 63. 
223. Doyle, supra note 222, at 91. 
224. Id at 79 ("Secretary of War Stanton, especially ... was so amiable in 
his relations with them as to lay himself open to charges of being the Radicals' 
representative in meetings of the Cabinet."). 
225. !d. at 76. 
226. !d. 
227. !d. at 95. 
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The committee got very bad press in the first century after it, but 
has gotten better treatment by historians in recent decades.228 
Thus, as a crude yardstick, one might compare a congressional 
oversight inquiry tasked with very "hawkish" review of the 
conduct of the Afghanistan war with two predecessors that cast 
large but different shadows: the criticized Civil War Joint 
Committee and the benign MacArthur Inquiry. Using these as 
rough markers, an inquiry may legitimately bring top officials 
before it, including top generals (albeit without interfering with 
their involvement in campaigning); pose questions about strategy; 
and even signal congressional preferences for one view over 
another. And, that committee's reports may influence 
appropriations and nominee confirmations. 
The President may legitimately object that the inquiry crosses 
the constitutional line when it substantially undermines the 
obedience of military commanders to orders. That could happen if 
the committee repeatedly took more commanders from the field, 
criticized them for not pushing harder than what came through the 
chain of command, and achieved substantial success in doing so. 
An important factor consists of whether the field commanders 
themselves develop pent-up resentment of what they consider 
insufficiently "hawkish" leadership coming down from the 
President. The field commanders could begin to take into account 
the committee's advice, public support, and influence on 
congressional appropriations. Such commanders would feel 
enabled to deviate from the "less hawkish" line of the Commander 
in Chief. Even then, the committee would not necessarily succeed 
in wooing commanders far from their normally extremely powerful 
allegiance to the President and his high command. And, only then 
would a congressional committee intrude so far and so deeply into 
command as to raise a material doubt about its constitutionality. 
C. Shared Powers: The Example of Poppy Eradication 
This Part moves on from the central Commander in Chief 
issues to those "shared" with Congress. A "shared issue," for this 
Article's purposes, occurs in a war zone and, by making policy, 
may affect the conduct of the war by the Commander in Chief. 
228. This better treatment may owe to both the more objective and deeper 
inquiries of recent historians, and perhaps greater understanding of the 
viewpoint of the Radical Republicans in Congress. Improved treatment by 
historians may also owe to the very good record of modem investigations like 
the Truman Committee and the MacArthur Inquiry, which restored confidence 
in congressional wartime oversight. 
436 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
However, it does so without specifically interfering with the 
Commander in Chiefs central issues of command, disposition of 
forces, or campaigning. 
Broadly speaking, many aspects of context shape the 
constitutional analysis of a shared issue.229 Considering these 
contextual aspects, and their relationship with constitutional text or 
tradition, Congress may have a large valid role. Congress may 
draw support from direct application of one of Congress's 
specifically enumerated Article I powers relating to war. That is, 
the issue of shared war-related authority has substantially more of 
an Article I connection to Congress than merely its involving, like 
all government operations, congressional appropriations. 
For example, the issue may arise of what to do with captured 
property. This does arise in the war zone, but it does not involve 
command, disposition of forces, or even campaigning. Moreover, it 
does involve ex~ress Article I congressional powers over the 
making of policy. 30 This mix of factors makes it a shared issue. 
Furthermore, a shared issue may have some kind of history or 
precedents. This mayor may not favor Presidents. For example, 
Presidents have a history of providing for the administration of 
occupied territory until Congress does. This means that Congress 
has not only the potential, but also the record, for sharing in the 
power. Congress may have even let its role lapse for a while and 
then reclaimed it. By doing so, Congress clarifies that it shares 
these areas.231 
Three areas illustrate concretely how Article I, and the history 
of Congress's activity, shape the constitutional analysis of shared 
issues. First, an issue of international law that has had a dramatic 
role in the 2000s, the Bush administration believed it had extreme 
wartime powers of not being constrained br: the Geneva 
Conventions in handling Guantanamo detainees? 2 The Framers 
shaped Article I so that primarily Congress, not the President, 
would authorize exceptions to internationallaw.233 And, Congress 
has compiled an impressive history of relevant action. 
229. See Michael J. Glennon, The Use o/Custom in Resolving Separation 0/ 
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REv. 109 (1984). 
230. See Kent, supra note 63. 
231. During the reform era of the 1970s after Vietnam and Watergate, 
Congress reclaimed its role in a number of areas it had let lapse to some degree. 
Congress revisited issues of initiating war, making international agreements, 
making policy for foreign and military aid, overseeing intelligence and covert 
actions, overcoming executive privilege in national security matters, and curbing 
impoundments, among other issues. FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 134. 
232. See Lobel, supra note 4. 
233. See Kent, supra note 63. 
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Second, take the issue of oversight of intelligence or covert 
actions. The issue had a dramatic role in the 2000s as President 
Bush asserted extreme wartime powers such as warrantless 
eavesdropping on phone conversations.234 Prior to this, in the 
1970s, Congress revived its role by the creation of congressional 
intelligence committees, establishment of the system of annual 
intelligence authorization laws, and enactment of specific major 
legislation.235 Observers analyzing the making of policy for the 
new eavesdropping could, and some did, find solid footing for 
Congress's role in that history. 
Furthermore, take the issue of rules for the conduct of 
warfare.236 Article I charges Congress to "make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.,,237 
Moreover, Article I also charges Congress to "make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water,'.238 a provision of 
renewed importance when the issues of detainees became 
prominent in the 2000S?39 From these grants of power to make 
rules and regulations has come far more than merely manuals of 
court-martial procedures.24o 
Third, a last large area of shared powers concerns military 
spending. The holding back of appropriated spending is termed an 
"impoundment." An extensive history concerns the congressional 
handling of appropriations, including military appropriations. In 
the last century, Congress has mainly gone from more specific line 
items that constrained the executive to lump-sum appropriations 
that gave the executive great spending discretion. 
Sometimes Presidents have impounded appropriations rather 
than spent them. The issue came to a climax in the Nixon 
administration, with President Nixon apparently asserting a vast 
power to make impoundments. The Nixon administration 
impounded more domestically, where the administration wanted to 
234. See Ford, supra note 47; Kitrosser, supra note 47. 
235. FRANK J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 1947-1989 (1990). In the era from World War II to 
the 1970s, Congress had somewhat slept on its duties of authorization and 
oversight of the activities of the intelligence agencies generally. Id. 
236. See Lobel, supra note 4. 
237. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; see also Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist's 
Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law, 77 
IND. L.J. 701, 707 (2002). 
238. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
239. Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the 
Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
933, 963 (2007). 
240. For example, these powers of Congress encompass directions for the 
treatment of detainees, a very big issue in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. 
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save money, than it impounded military expenditures with which it 
was not so unhappy. The Nixon position collapsed, mainly by the 
enactment of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which closed 
the prior loopholes used to justify impoundments.241 
As to military spending, the modem system of mainly lump-
sum military appropriations has given the Defense Department 
considerable scope. The Department must respect the committee 
reports that loosely structure those lump sums and must consult 
sufficiently with the committees to make limited funding 
redirections during the fiscal year. Beyond these requirements, it 
has discretion. When Presidents want to bring a weapons program 
or the like to an end, they enter the lists for the annual 
appropriations used for combat and accept the result. Should they 
not succeed, they have no beef with the constitutional system and 
no right to impound, just as they have no right to make a line item 
veto. They simply did not have the votes. 
Still, the issue of whether Congress can step up a war by 
appropriations provisions may bring back the issue of military 
impoundments. A President not wanting to obey appropriation 
provisions to go after Taliban border sanctuaries or to launch a 
poppy eradication program may cast his military spending 
impoundment as somehow different from defiance of laws.242 In 
that way, the President would go looking for precedents in which 
other Presidents have justified-very rarely-sizable military 
impoundments (extremely rarely, if ever, in a war zone). 
1. Analysis 
The hypothetical for analysis concerns a program of poppy 
eradication in Taliban-dominated areas, which exemplifies how 
congressional policymaking may influence the war zone. Afghan 
opium poppy growing constitutes a double menace. Afghanistan 
provides the lion's share of the raw material for the deadly world 
heroin trade. In addition, the Taliban obtain substantial revenue 
from opium poppies. 
The United States could launch a program against opium 
poppies by large-scale aerial defoliation. However, the Bush and 
Obama administrations have not carried out such a program?43 
241. See Seema Mittal, Note, The Constitutionality of an Expedited 
Rescission Act: The New Line Item Veto or a New Constitutional Method of 
AchieVing Deficit Reduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 125 (2007). 
242. See Timothy R. Hamer, Presidential Power to Impound Appropriations 
for Defense and Foreign Relations, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 131 (1982). 
243. See generally, e.g., Associated Press, U.S. to Shift Approach to 
Afghanistan's Drug Trade, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2009, at A26. 
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Partly, these administrations have feared the alienation of poppy-
growing farmers?44 The U.S. would prefer to wean Afghan 
growers off poppies onto substitute crops. Crop substitution, unlike 
the blunt step of destroying their livelihood by defoliation, would 
avoid their taking up arms on the side of the Taliban. Partly, both 
administrations appear to have been held back b~ the Afghan 
government's reluctance to support such a program.2 5 
Such a self-imposed policy limitation offers the type of issue 
that might bring out differences in "hawkishness" and, in tum, the 
constitutional clash. The President starts out refusing to implement 
in the war zone a particular policy that is aggressive but considered 
risky. In Congress, a "hawkish" opposition may have the votes for 
an appropriation provision that mandates the expenditure of a half-
billion dollars for eradication. May the Commander in Chief refuse 
to proceed with the mandated spending program? 
On such an issue, the analysis no longer concerns the central 
issues of the Commander in Chief on which the President's 
position starts out at maximum strength: command, disposition of 
forces, and campaigning?46 Rather, this issue involves the more 
level playing field of "shared" issues-issues only incidental to the 
Commander in Chiefs power. Congress still must share these 
issues with the President because they occur in the war zone and 
may affect the locals or the enemy. 
2. The Confiscation Act of 1862 
One of history's most striking warzone congressional programs 
that the President opposed has received scholarly attention 
lately.247 During the first half of the Civil War, a major evolving 
issue consisted of what the Union armies would do with 
244. JONES, supra note 13, at 196--97. 
245. The Afghan government's reluctance to have such a program may stem 
from concerns about alienating its farming population, corruption in the 
government, or both. 
246. Assume that contractors hired by the State Department's Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs could perform almost all 
the work so that it would hardly affect the disposition of forces. Contractor 
defoliation would not significantly affect the command of regular military forces 
and the campaign of those forces. Eradication would have an impact on the 
locals and on the enemy, and thus, incidentally, on campaigning. That it has an 
incidental impact neither rules in nor rules out presidential arguments, but 
merely distinguishes the issue from those, like a mandate for cross-border 
incursions, in which congressional action concerns central issues directly, not 
merely incidentally. 
247. See Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4; Lobel, 
supra note 4. 
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Confederate slaves encountered during military campaigns.248 This 
issue came to a head in the congressional debate on the 
Confiscation Act of 1862. This historical example has some 
parallels to today's issues. Slaves, like opium poppies, were 
contraband of war-treated by the other side in each conflict as its 
property and by the United States side as subject to, respectively, 
liberation (of slaves) or eradication (of poppies) in a way that 
voided those property rights without due process or compensation. 
On the other hand, Presidents were concerned about antagonizing 
neutrals in the conflict by overly aggressive action.249 
As to the contraband of 1862, on one hand were the Radical 
Republicans in Congress, who sought from slave owners 
maximum confiscation of, and freedom for, the slaves. This 
appealed to the Radical Republicans both from abolitionist 
sympathies and from a desire to take harsh ("hawkish") measures 
toward the enemy. 
On the other hand, objections included President Lincoln's that 
the timing was not yet ripe for such a measure. Lincoln reversed 
the orders (prior to legislation) of officers--orders that could be 
called "hawkish"-to free such slaves.25o As he said about a 
similar step, it would "alarm our Southern Union friends, and tum 
them against us-perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for 
Kentucky. ,,251 
Of note, some opponents of the measure raised Commander in 
Chief arguments.252 As one Senator discussed, 
If Congress could not regulate such "active operations in 
the field"-could not "direct the movements of the 
Army"-[he] reasoned, it necessarily followed that neither 
could Congress require the President to confiscate enemy 
property, or to perform any of the other wartime functions 
traditionally determined by the Commander in Chief.253 
Another Senator reasoned that 
the Constitution declares that the President is Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy, "investing him with the 
248. Lobel, supra note 4, at 431. 
249. The border states that Lincoln wanted to keep in the Union had slave 
owners who did not necessarily actively support the Confederacy. The Afghan 
poppy farmers similarly do not necessarily actively support the Taliban. 
250. Lobel, supra note 4, at 431. 
251. Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 1010. 
252. Some opponents pressed other issues: that it violated the laws of war; 
that it was an uncompensated taking of property; and that the Constitution might 
not permit Congress to do this. [d. at 1011-12. 
253. [d. at 1014 (quoting Senator Browning). 
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war-making power," and "[h]e is the commander ... only 
restrained in so far by Congress in that he must depend 
upon them to foot his bill and authorize his levies. ,,254 
This argument lost out. President Lincoln objected to the bill 
but never joined in a Commander in Chief argument.255 Congress 
enacted it in a sligQtl~ moderated form, giving some respect to 
Lincoln's objections.25 
These political stances of Congress and the President, although 
rooted in their own time and circumstances, contain some 
suggestions for a debate today about a shared policy issue in a war 
zone, like poppy eradication. Both policy issues have as their 
driving engine a wartime, war zone program that the Commander 
in Chief opposes as too "hawkish." This opposition consists of that 
program's visiting harm on those on the enemy's side, loosely 
speaking-Confederate slaveholders then and Taliban obtaining 
funding from Afghan poppies today-who anger the public and the 
members of Congress into calling for harsh measures. Meanwhile, 
the Commander in Chief does not want to bum his country's 
bridges to those not really on the enemy's side and susceptible of 
being won over or at least staying neutral. 
So, the Commander in Chief and those who support him may 
argue that Congress's pushing the President amounts to intruding 
into campaigning. But, it does not directly concern this. The 
legislation does not instruct the President about whether or how to 
employ the military in the field. The constitutional dispute occurs 
on a level playing field, not with a presumption or strong doubt as 
to its constitutionality. 
3. Contemporary War Policy Provisions 
The Iraq insurgency provides further insight about Congress's 
power to legislate shared policy aspects even in the war zone. A 
portentous change occurred in the election of 2006, which brought 
a change in both the House and the Senate from a Republican to a 
Democratic majority. The issue of Iraq was at the forefront in the 
Congress of 2007-2008. President Bush fought off legislative 
proposals for a drawdown or for setting a deadline for withdrawal. 
When Congress enacted a supplemental appropriation in 2007, it 
included a provision for timetables for phased redeployment of the 
troopS.257 President Bush vetoed this, saying that "the measure 
254. Lobel, supra note 4, at 431 (quoting Senator Cowan). 
255. Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 1015. 
256. Id. 
257. 63 CQ ALMANAC 2-57 (2007). 
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'infringes upon the powers vested in the presidency by the 
Constitution. ",258 In the attempted, but unsuccessful, veto override, 
"Democrats used the floor debate to dispute the president's 
assertion that they were infringing on his rights as commander in 
chief and his criticism that they were trying to micromanage the 
war by substituting their judgment for that of military 
commanders. ,,259 
Apart from the legislated drawdown attempt, a few important 
proposals did win passage as appropriation bills in this Congress, 
reflecting the limits of what the Commander in Chief s argument 
could defeat.26o In 2008, Congress enacted a striking provision that 
included a "ban on using funds authorized by the bill to establish 
permanent military bases in Iraq.,,261 Congress had traditionally 
exercised the power in peacetime to decide when to use funds to 
establish permanent bases. This provision went further and 
exercised that power in the war zone. Congress had debated a 
number of such provisions, eliminating or rewriting some that the 
White House threatened to veto. Congress retained others, 
particularly "language aimed at continuing congressional oversight 
of the wars. ,,262 
The outcome of the Confiscation Act, like that of contemporary 
defense authorization provisions, indicates that such a program as a 
mandated poppy eradication program would not necessarily fall 
prey of constitutional doubts. In fact, the Confiscation Act in 1862 
did make a leap forward in its aspect of the Civil War-the freeing 
of slaves-and in this respect it anticipated the further step forward 
in the Emancipation Proclamation. 
Accordingly, the "shared" issues remain openly debatable 
between Congress and the President, focusing on their particular 
subject, drafting, purposes, and so on. Unlike the "central" issues 
of the Commander in Chief, these do not start with a presumption 
or doubt against them, even when they step up a war. 
D. Impounded Funding/or Programs to Step Up a War 
258. Id. at 2-58. 
259. Jd 
260. An important proposal concerned the aftermath of the Nisur Square 
incident, in which a shooting by Blackwater private security contractors killed 
many civilians. The defense authorization law carried a provision for the 
Defense Secretary to set regulations for the selection, training, and conduct of 
private security personnel in combat zones. Id. at 6-10. 
261. 64 CQ ALMANAC 6-7 (2008). Admittedly, this is a classic restrictive and 
limiting appropriation rider. The views of the Congress of 2007-2008 were no 
more "hawkish" about Iraq than those of President Bush. 
262. Id. 
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A "hawkish" opposition in Congress may enact large 
appropriations for a favored "hawkish" program like poppy 
eradication. The President may oppose funding for programs not in 
his budget request. Does the President, as Commander in Chief, 
have the power to refuse to spend-i.e., to impound-the Unsought 
funding? For all the extreme claims of constitutional authority by 
President George W. Bush and, to a lesser extent, some of his 
predecessors, none have revived the lapsed and discredited 
impoundment claim. However, enactment of a program opposed 
by the President might well spark at least renewed executive 
consideration of whether to assert a power not to spend the funds 
for the program. That power is impoundment. 
1. Impoundment BackgrounJ263 
The supporters of military impoundments try to show a long 
and distinguished history. However, they have only limited support 
in trying to isolate attempted military impoundments from 
attempted civilian impoundments. Impoundments of defense funds 
have occurred more or less together with those of other funds. 
Presidents did not generally perform peculiarly military 
impoundments, with special invocations of the Commander in 
Chief clause for some special category of defense spending. 
Underlining this point, the military impoundments that did take 
place mostly occurred in peacetime, not wartime. In other words, 
Presidents did not try to establish a stron8\ Commander in Chief 
impoundment function in the war zone.2 They simply sought 
economy, almost always at home, not staking their claim to 
impoundment power on a difference between military and civilian 
impoundments. 
To briefly review, early instances of recognizable mili~ 
impoundment were few until the modem era after World War II.2 
263. See generally Ralph S. Abascal & John R. Kramer, Presidential 
Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 
GEO. LJ. 1549 (1974) [hereinafter Abascal & Kramer, Presidential 
Impoundment Part 1]; Ralph S. Abascal & John R. Kramer, Presidential 
Impoundment Part II: Judicial and Legislative Responses, 63 GEO. L.J. 149 
(1974). 
264. For example, President Nixon, the leading presidential impounder, had a 
live war in Indochina. But, he did not make his impoundment claims with regard 
to spending there. 
265. Brownell, supra note 65, at 35. President Jefferson impounded funding 
for some gunboats. Id at 31. No substantially recognizable impoundments 
occurred until Grant. See id at 33. Even then, although the funds were for the 
Army Corps of Engineers, they served domestic non-military purposes of river 
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President Truman impounded a portion of the funds for air force 
squadrons beyond what he had requested, plus funding for two 
carriers,266 on grounds of his Commander in Chief powers. 267 
President Kennedy impounded funds for a long-range bomber,268 
fighting the issue to a draw?69 President Johnson slowed down 
billions for domestic funding, such as for large highway 
programs,270 but did not completely cancel projects?71 More 
important, President Johnson did not impound defense funding. 
Impoundment first really burst onto the legal consciousness 
under President Nixon. President Nixon made billions of dollars of 
impoundments to cut back on what he saw as excessive 
congressional spending. Those Nixon impoundments 
overwhelmingly concerned domestic spending, not military 
spending. Nixon's impoundments suffered a landmark defeat in the 
Supreme Court, completing the picture of impoundment far more 
concerning civilian than military spending.272 
Congress responded vigorously to impoundments by enacting 
funding again with stronger provisions. Courts ruled against the 
validity of impoundments, including the Supreme Court in a 
statutory (not constitutional) case?73 And, Congress enacted the 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which closed all the statutory 
loopholes cited as allowing impoundment. 274 Also, in the 
Impoundment Control Act, Congress gave the President an 
alternative channel of making rescission requests that would 
receive expedited congressional treatment.275 As a result of the 
and harbor work. Roosevelt impounded relatively large sums, but typically from 
domestic activities like public works. 
266. Stanton, supra note 34, at 12. 
267. See Stassen, supra note 33, at 1185 n.133. 
268. See id at 1163-68. President Eisenhower made some relatively small 
impoundments of funds for aircraft and missiles. See Stanton, supra note 34, at 12. 
269. In a dramatic interchange, President Kennedy worked out with the angry 
House Armed Services Committee Chair, Carl Vinson, a compromise that the 
language for the funds be made permissive, rather than mandatory. Stanton, 
supra note 34, at 13. 
270. One major struggle concerned nuclear powered surface ships. Stassen, 
supra note 33, at 1168-76. 
271. Stanton, supra note 34, at 13-14. 
272. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975). The ruling only 
concerned statutory grounds. The administration deliberately chose not to make 
a constitutional argument, presumably for the unacknowledged but generally 
recognized reason that it would lose dramatically. 
273. Stanton, supra note 34. 
274. See Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto 
Act, 35 HARv. 1. ON LEGIS. 297, 309 (1998). 
275. Stanton, supra note 34. 
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Impoundment Control Act, the President must admit that his 
proposed impoundments represented merely the lack of 
congressional support for his budgetary preferences. There has not 
been extensive discussion about impoundments after the political 
and legal defeats of President Nixon's efforts to impound. 
Since Nixon's time, there have been just a very few 
suggestions that a President might revive the all-but-obliterated 
claim of power.276 The kind of credence and support for a 
presidential tool to cut spending that had previously gone into the 
impoundment claim instead went into the push for a statutory line 
item veto.277 That effort died when the Supreme Court struck down 
the line item veto during the Clinton administration.278 Although 
the administration of George W. Bush made some exaggerated 
constitutional claims, it does not appear to have invoked visibly a 
power to make impoundment% whether across the board or just 
about military impoundments.2 
2. Lack of Viability of Specifically Military Impoundment 
At first glance, the claim of national security impoundment 
power may look distinctive and viable. During the heart of the 
impoundment controversy in the early 1970s, some commentators 
thought so, pointing to precedents of Presidents like Truman and 
Kennedy who had asserted the claimed power on specifically 
military expenditures.28o 
However, today the claim of national security impoundment 
power looks outdated as well as unsupported. First and foremost, 
Presidents hardly employed it after the Nixon era, when it had its 
276. See Brownell, supra note 65, at 53-55. 
277. See generally Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: 
Reflections on Constitutional Liberties and the Rule of Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1. 
278. Roy E. Brownell, II, Comment, The Unnecessary Demise of the Line 
Item Veto Act: The Clinton Administration's Costly Failure to Seek 
Acknowledgment of "National Security Rescission," 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1273, 
1277 (1998). 
279. Articles about the Bush administration's claims of executive power 
reflect that the impoundment controversy involved the distant past. See 
generally Saikrishna B. Prakash, Imperial and Imperiled: The Curious State of 
the Executive, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1021 (2008). There were so many 
cryptic signing statements on defense appropriations that some statements could 
have meant to signify the reservation of a right to impound, but no visible 
impoundment controversies ensued. 
280. Abascal & Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I, supra note 263; 
Stassen, supra note 33. The congressional side of the issue did not have great 
dignity. Rather, the classic use of the power seemed to have been aiming at the 
vulnerable target of congressional pork-barrel spending or bloated weapons 
programs. 
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rise and fall. It did not survive the triple impact of the Supreme 
Court's Train v. City of New Yor!?81 case invalidating 
impoundments, the Impoundment Control Act, and the general 
lapse of far-out executive assertions during Vietnam and 
Watergate. 
Any number of times during the period from the Nixon 
administration to the present, Congress appropriated more for 
various military items than Presidents wanted, like unsought or 
excess spending on weapons systems. This spending did not get 
impounded.282 The 35-year abandonment of this kind of claim 
eloquently speaks of the White House's having lost hope in such a 
claim?83 And, a "hawkish" Congress might take up this 
controversy with zeal, having picked the program to push from a 
strong sense of its political viability. This contrasts with the kind of 
impoundments that Presidents have found easier to fight against, 
namely, impoundments for pork-barrel, bloated, hard-to-defend 
spending. 
Furthermore, the President would face the same effectively 
unanswerable argument he had always faced in both the 
impeachment and the line item veto contexts. Constitutionally, the 
President had an array of other tools to deal with disapproved 
congressional spending items, above all, the presidential power to 
threaten to veto bills unless offending items came out. That had 
sufficed for so long that it seemed an unconstitutional and drastic 
alteration of the system to supplement it with a novel power to take 
offending items out. 
This argument has special force after the Bush presidency. 
President Bush used veto threats to eliminate or to get redrafted 
many items in defense authorization and appropriation bills, 
especially in 2007-200S?84 He dramatically demonstrated the 
viability of the veto as a tool to maintain the prerogatives of a 
Commander in Chief in a war. As with cut-off provisions, 
Congress could only make mandatory spending items go through if 
281. 420 U.S. 35 (1975). 
282. For example, President Clinton did not want all the funds that the 
Republican Congress of 1995-2000 appropriated for missile defense systems. 
283. Moreover, a President who impounds the funds for a specific item 
Congress created to step up a war might thereby choose a greater and more 
difficult controversy than he wants. In the impoundment battles of the past, 
Presidents like Nixon and Johnson could argue they saved billions of dollars and 
thereby had a real impact on budget deficits. The focused challenge to one 
controversial wartime item, like poppy eradication spending, depends on the 
item's effect on war zone campaigning, and does not involve the vastly larger, 
budget-affecting weapon systems for future wars. 
284. See discussion supra Part IV.C.3 (concerning the limited items that got 
through, like a ban on spending for permanent military bases). 
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it felt able to win a difficult kind of public contest with the 
President. 285 
Given that the presidential claim of impoundment power has 
been abandoned with good reason, congressional spending 
programs as to a shared power in the war zone do not start out with 
a presumption or even an automatic material doubt against them. 
For a President to revive the claims of a military impoundment 
power for just this occasion would revive an enormous controversy 
that even President Bush let lie. The situation resembles how 
Presidents have not asserted an inherent power to make a line item 
veto even of an item in an unwieldy omnibus continuing 
resolution. Presidents have trouble explaining why they should 
have, as a constitutional matter, this major power when they 
already have the veto power. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This survey and analysis suggests several conclusions. First 
and foremost, it invites the viewing of the wartime constitutional 
relationship of the President and Congress in a new way. Hitherto, 
constitutional analysis viewed the President as always more 
"hawkish," more aggressive, and more lusting to expand war than 
Congress. Congress only chose between the roles of passive 
partner or, if active at all, striving to limit or restrain war. 
Now, however, the discussion in this Article suggests a way to 
analyze the possibility of a very different Congress, one more 
"hawkish" and aggressive than the President. More "hawkish" may 
have occurred in the past less often than the Congresses that are 
either passive or restraining. But, however often the "hawkish" 
Congress occurs, it tests the Constitution in new ways. 
Moreover, strategically, the United States faces a new defense 
situation after 9/11. The United States faces conflicts, large and 
small, in any number of nations that may host enemies. In each 
such conflict, the United States may well face choices among 
greater or lesser degrees of aggressiveness, variations about which 
reasonable national security may disagree in the extent to which 
the President and Congress might go different ways. 
285. Congress and the President would accuse each other of not making 
funding available to American troops who are engaged in the field in fighting a 
dangerous foe. The 1990s taught that the public trusted the President more in 
such a dispute. Looking back, it was only after a President had undermined the 
public trust that Congress could put through Indochina cut-offs in the early 
1970s and Boland Amendment cut-offs in the mid-1980s. See generally Fisher, 
supra note 19 (discussing several of the President-Congress disputes). 
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On the one hand, a crusading President may elicit the 
traditional congressional provisions of limitation and restraint. 
However, on the other hand, a "less hawkish" President may elicit 
provisions from Congress that take an aggressive stance and go 
past previous policy lines. These are not wars like World War I 
and II, or the Gulf War, as to which, once underway, Congress 
does not scrap with Presidents about the scope. It may be a whole 
new world. 
Furthermore, in shaking up the old ways of thinking, these 
different situations play mix and match with the previously clear 
correlations of the policy toward war and the support for branches 
of government. Traditionally, pro-executive observers felt 
comfortable on multiple grounds to challenge congressional 
provisions as dovish. Such pro-executive observers would oppose 
the cut-off provisions for the Vietnam War, the restraining Boland 
Amendments for the Contra war, or the provisions of the Detainee 
Treatment Act against extreme treatment. Conversely, pro-
congressional observers supported these provisions, also feeling 
comfortable on multiple grounds. However, once the focus of 
analysis turns to "hawkish" provisions, such views line up 
differently. Those favoring the validity of "hawkish" steps in 
wartime must learn sometimes to defend congressional power, and 
those opposing such validity must learn to argue the pro-executive 
position. 
This new kind of thinking may produce a more nuanced, three-
dimensional way of addressing this subject. An observer must take 
each constitutional issue on its individual merits rather than take an 
ideological line that the executive, or the Congress, must always 
prove right; or that the "hawkish," or non-"hawkish," view must 
always prove right. Certainly, the author experienced a need in 
analyzing this Article's hypotheticals to think more flexibly. 
Additionally, this fresh perspective teases apart the separate 
significance of the differences among Congress's Article I powers 
and among the Commander in Chief's powers. This Article's 
analysis builds, as noted, on recent scholarly work responding to 
the formalistic doctrinal theories put forth for President Bush's 
actions-recent work that develops the many specific instances in 
American history of meaningful constitutional interaction. 
Hitherto, observers tended, when discussing appropriation 
provisions, to lump all provisions together as one always-
applicable "Congressional Power." And, observers defending the 
executive tended, when analyzing constitutional issues, to lump the 
different aspects of the Commander in Chief power, and other 
powers, together. However, it appears that the "No Appropriation" 
clause has a one-way effect, supporting restrictions or limitations 
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but not mandatory appropriations. Moreover, it accomplishes little 
to try to lump all the different aspects of the theatre of war together 
under one sprawling "Commander in Chief' power. The mention 
of that power provides no magic incantation to shoo away all 
congressional action. Each provision warrants analysis on its own. 
This view suggests greater precision than in the past about the 
particular congressional authority at issue and the particular 
complaint of intrusion upon the Commander in Chief. 
Moreover, currently a substantial fraction of the provisions at 
issue, or their most relevant immediate precedents, comes aboard 
one of the defense authorization or appropriation provisions. The 
defense authorization system, and the rest of the work of the armed 
services (and sometimes foreign affairs and intelligence) 
committees, took on extraordinary importance after World War 
1I.286 These take on even greater importance after 9/11. Often, 
examination of the record of similar provisions considered by these 
committees puts a concrete and persuasive context around the 
proposal of particular challenged provisions. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes said, famously, that "a page of history 
[was] worth a volume of logic.,,287 Today, that page of history 
often comes from the run-up in past authorization and 
appropriation bills. For example, when the system of joint 
combatant commands has strong statutory roots, it makes little 
sense to conjure up some executive genie, some unique 
Commander in Chief power to decide military structures, that can 
blow the latest provision away. When the impoundment power has 
lapsed for almost 40 years of military appropriations, it makes little 
sens~ !o drag that genie out for impounding some recent spending 
prOVlSlon. 
Thus, the provisions and hypotheticals discussed in this Article 
may provide, hopefully, a new frontier for study of the war power. 
In these and other respects, it is hoped the Article may enable those 
looking for the fresh challenges in analysis of war powers to 
awaken out of their "dogmatic slumber.,,288 
286. See generally BLECHMAN, supra note 128. 
287. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
288. IMMANuEL KANT, Introduction to PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE 
METAPHYSICS (paul Cams trans., 1902) (1783), available at http:// 
www.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/phil%20306/kant_materials/prolegomena2.htm 
(Kant's famous self-description of what occurred when he read Hume). 

